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12 December 1967

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A RUSSIAN AIRMAN DOWNED IN YEMEN

U.S. Gets Reports Soviet
Pilots Aid Republicans

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 12—The United States has received reliable reports that Soviet pilots have been flying combat missions for the republican Government of Yemen in recent fighting there. American officials reported

tonight that a Russian was shot down late last week by royalist tribes a few miles north of Sana, the Yemeni capital. He was reported to have died when his plane crashed.

Intelligence reports indicate that he had been on a bombing and strafing mission against Royalist positions when his plane, a Soviet-built MIG fighter, was shot down.

His body was reported to have been inspected by Royalists and European mercenaries fighting with them, some of whom read Russian. According to reports from Yemen, the pilot carried Soviet identification papers, maps and other documentation in Russian.

Pilot Was a Captain

These documents were reported to show that the pilot was a Soviet Air Force captain. His name was not given.

From this and other reports, officials here have concluded that some airmen are serving as combat pilots for a shipment of MIG-19 fighter-bombers hurriedly sent to Yemen in November to replace the departing Egyptian Air Force. Yemen had no known qualified pilots for these jets.

Diplomatic reports from Yemen last month indicated that the Soviet Union had promised to send the Yemen Government 24 MIG-19's and about 40 technicians to help assemble the

planes. When the first planes were seen, partly assembled, at the Sana airport on Nov. 20, there was no evidence that Soviet pilots were also on hand.

There was no immediate indication of the size of the Soviet contingent. But American officials put the total number of Soviet military advisers and technicians in Yemen at about 50 men.

Previously the Yemeni republican regime leaned heavily on Egyptian planes to hold the royalists at bay in the country's five-year-old civil war. But this support was removed when the United Arab Republic agreed in late September to pull its forces out of Yemen.

NEW YORK TIMES

14 December 1967

Soviet Airlift Said to Aid Yemeni Republicans

By HEDRICK SMITH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 14 — The Soviet Union has quietly carried out an emergency air-war, diplomats consider it a lift to supply the embattled Yemeni republican regime with military aid, Western diplomatic sources reported today.

These sources regarded the Soviet support, which has included the use of Soviet Air Force pilots for combat raids, as a major factor in tipping the balance, at least temporarily, in favor of the republic against the royalists who seek to overthrow it.

Diplomatic sources said there were 75 to 100 flights of Soviet AN-12 transports and Ilyushin-28 bombers, apparently serving as transport planes, into Yemen in the last three weeks.

They have been carrying MIG fighters, crews, technicians, bombs and other munitions, and ground equipment, diplomatic sources reported. At least 24 MIG-19 fighter-bombers have been included in the shipments, according to these reports.

Diplomatic sources describe the airlift as approximately one-

fourth the number of flights in the Soviet military airlift to Egypt after the Arab-Israeli war. But for Yemen and the modest scale of its five-year-old war, diplomats consider it a "massive" effort and a not insignificant Soviet commitment to the survival of the Yemeni Republic.

The Soviet decision to provide the Yemeni regime with military aid first came to light in late November when some MIG-19's were seen at the airfield near Sana, the Yemeni capital. But not until now has the extent of the Soviet support to the Yemeni Republic become known.

Western analysts now estimate that Soviet transports, reaching Yemen after flights over Egypt, have ferried about 10,000 tons of equipment to Yemen. Because royalist forces have been closing in on Sana, most of the flights have been to the airfield at Hodeida, the Soviet-built port on the Red Sea.

At least one Russian pilot was reliably reported to have been shot down during a strafing raid against royalist positions a few miles outside Sana.

European mercenaries have seen Russian maps, documents and other markings identifying him as a Soviet Air Force captain. Western diplomats believe that possibly a dozen Soviet combat pilots are flying for the republican regime.

"For all intents and purposes you could say there is a Russian MIG squadron operating in Yemen," said one well-informed analyst. "The markings on the planes are Yemeni. But the planes are Russian-built and supplied, the ground crews are Russians, and most of the pilots seem to be Russians."

Reports from Yemen indicate that the air attacks have inflicted severe casualties on royalist forces and have slowed the momentum of their drive to capture Sana.

For five years the republic was propped up by the presence of Egyptian troops, which numbered 70,000 at their peak in late 1965. But President Gamel Abdel Nasser has withdrawn all but a few hundred Egyptian soldiers under an agreement with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, who has armed and financed the royalists. The departure of the final Egypt-

ian contingent is reported to be imminent.

The United States and Britain, which regard Yemen of little strategic value, are puzzled by Moscow's eagerness to replace Cairo as the political patron of the Yemeni Republic, especially while it is so weak politically and militarily.

American officials speculate that the Russians, if successful in their efforts to save the republican regime, intend to use Yemen as a base for mounting subversion in East Africa and other parts of the Arabian Peninsula. Somalia and Ethiopia lie only 50 miles across the Red Sea from Yemen.

THE EVENING STAR
6 December 1967

Soviet Presence in Mideast Growing in War's Aftermath

By ANDREW BOROWIEC
Foreign Correspondent of The Star

BEIRUT—On the western bank of the Suez Canal, Soviet military experts man Egyptian army missiles pointed toward Israeli positions.

Between 40 and 50 Soviet warships criss-cross the Mediterranean, until recently almost a private preserve of the U.S. 6th Fleet.

And in the craggy Hashid Mountains of Yemen, Soviet agents distribute silver coins and rifles to Royalist tribesmen to buy their allegiance for the Republican regime.

Six months after the Soviet-backed Arab armies were defeated by Israel, the Soviet presence in the Arab world continues to make a steady progress. Even pro-Western King Hussein of Jordan has traveled to Moscow and the Shah of Iran, a pro-American bastion on the fringes of the Middle East, has announced he plans to buy arms from Russia.

Defender's Role

A year, the Russian bear was still cautiously eyeing the sands and oilfields of the Middle East. Today Russia is deeply involved in Middle Eastern politics and, to a great extent, can influence any future conflict between Israel and the Arabs.

The fiercely independent Arabs have accepted a partnership with Soviet Russia for lack of a better, more powerful ally. On the international scene, Russia has emerged as the defender of the Arabs while the United States is becoming more and more identified with Israel.

Soviet aims in the complicated, risky, frustrating and dangerous Middle Eastern political game can be summed up as follows:

Russia does not need Middle Eastern oil but wants to make it difficult for the West to get it. Apparently it does not want a major war over the Israeli-Arab problem. Yet it wants to maintain and expand its influence, not only in the so-called progressive Arab countries, but in the while area as part of its global power politics.

4-Step Penetration

Israeli intelligence sources discern four stages in Russia's penetration of the Arab World:

1. Passive military and economic aid which began with the arms agreement with Egypt in 1955.

2. The encouragement of Arab neutralism to undermine the traditional links of Arab states with the West.

3. Creation of strong dependence on Russia in the military field and through economic projects such as Egypt's Aswan High Dam.

4. Strengthening of ideological links with various left-wing political parties in the Arab world.

Militarily, Egypt, Syria and Iraq in the Middle East proper, and Algeria in North Africa, have been made totally dependent on Soviet arms.

Since the June defeat, Russia is believed to have restored entirely Syria's military potential and replenished 80 percent of Egypt's arsenal. Algeria and Iraq did not suffer much in the hostilities.

These measures were not necessarily taken because Russia believes in the inevitability of a new conflict in the Middle East or feels that another clash would foster its aims. But to the seething and frustrated Arab countries sending arms was the only way of demonstrating Russia's support in the hour of need.

Bitterness Felt

That also does not mean that the Arabs are satisfied with the degree of Soviet backing. There was a great deal of bitterness in the Arab world when Russia failed to rush to the Arab side at the time of defeat.

Angry Soviet speeches at the United Nations, the breaking of diplomatic relations with Israel and the subsequent airlift of arms have somewhat alleviated this feeling.

Nevertheless more sophisticated Arab leaders are convinced that there is a limit to Soviet friendship—while they believe that the United States would not hesitate to help Israel all the way if it were really menaced.

It is difficult to obtain an

assessment of the Middle East situation from the Russians themselves. Those rare Soviet diplomats willing to engage in a discussion with a Western reporter speak of the need for peace and withdrawal of "Israel the aggressor" from the occupied territories.

Obviously, they do not talk of any Arab concessions.

It would seem logical that Russia wants peace in the Middle East. Yet it is difficult to reconcile this with the massive arms shipments to the "revolutionary" Arab countries and the presence of several thousand Soviet advisers in Arab armies.

One explanation for the influx of military experts is that Russia wants sole control of the more sophisticated weapons, such as the Luna ballistic missiles installed in the Suez Zone. The Russians thus are able to control escalation of the periodic violations of the cease-fire.

The Russians, obviously, are not interested in seeing their material smashed again.

It is in their interest to make sure that the Arab armies resemble somewhat their more sophisticated East European counterparts.

Hence the Soviet Union in effect imposed on Egypt's president Gamal Abdel Nasser a far-reaching reform of the cadres now supervised by between four and six Soviet generals.

To boost Egyptian morale and possibly deter more daring Israeli attacks, Soviet warships visit the Egyptian ports of Alexandria and Port Said almost continuously.

Boosting Nasser

In the diplomatic field, the Kremlin has appointed Serge Vinogradov, one of its top diplomats, as ambassador to Cairo. There is no doubt that Vinogradov has some influence on Nasser. But whether or not he can keep Nasser permanently "on the leash" is still a question.

The Egyptian disengagement in Yemen after a futile four-year war apparently prompted more Soviet interest in that part of the Arab world. It is not clear yet to what extent the Russians want to replace the Egyptian

military and political presence in Republican Yemen.

But there are persistent reports of new arrivals of Soviet officers in the Republican capital of San'a, while the Jenad airbase, some 12 miles east of Taiz, is now reportedly staffed by Russians.

There are also reports Soviet agents have distributed money and some 10,000 rifles to Yemeni tribesmen around San'a to win them to the Republican cause.

While the Mediterranean is no longer a private American lake and Soviet arms have become standard equipment in the biggest Arab armies, much of the Middle East is still largely outside Soviet influence.

Such oil-producing countries as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are strongly pro-Western—either by inclination or by nature of their business.

But whether they like it or not, all Arab countries have to pay at least lip service to Nasser's slogans of revenge against Israel. An Arab statesman can hardly compromise on this issue, regardless of his interest and allegiances.

Principal Developments in World Communist Affairs
(17 November to 12 December 1967)

1. Exactly three weeks after the anniversary of the Soviet Revolution, the CPSU and 17 other Communist Parties announced agreement to hold a "consultative meeting in February 1968 for a collective exchange of opinion concerning the convocation of an international meeting of Communist and workers' parties" and they called upon all fraternal parties to support the initiative and to take part in it. The communique named 18 parties which attended the consultative meeting in Moscow in March 1965 and which held bilateral consultations on the new move. Of course, there was no mention of the fact that 26 parties had been invited in 1965 (they were originally the members of the "drafting committee" for the 1960 81-party conference) and that seven (Rumania, Albania, and the Far East) parties had boycotted that meeting. Nor was mention made of Cuba, which participated in the 1965 meeting.

The communique stated the objectives of the international meeting as "strengthening the unity of the Communist movement" and "rallying all socialist, democratic forces ... against imperialism, for national and social liberation ... and for world peace." A front-page Pravda editorial on the 28th disavowed any attempt at interference in the internal affairs of, or the excommunication of, any other party. Reaction by other Communist media followed the pre-announcement pattern with endorsement by a considerable number of those claimed by the Soviets as supporting the move, no mention by Rumania, objection by Yugoslavia, and denunciation by China and Albania.

2. The Rumanians continue to play the role of maverick in international and internal affairs. Further strains in Rumanian-Soviet relations became evident as the Rumanian Party refused to yield to intense Soviet pressure to associate itself with the call for an international Communist conference. Shortly after, it was leaked to correspondents in Bucharest that Soviet-Rumanian talks on renewing their 1948 twenty-year bilateral friendship and mutual assistance treaty (which expires in February) had broken down over Moscow's refusal to agree to changes in the wording of the old treaty, especially in its references to the menace of West Germany and its requirement for mutual consultations on important foreign policy questions. After a series of apparently unsuccessful lower-level bilateral talks between the two, a strong Rumanian delegation headed by Ceausescu departed for Moscow on 12 December, apparently to attempt to salvage some sort of agreement on the many points at issue. Within Rumania, meanwhile, the party held its first National Conference since 1945. During that conference Secretary General Ceausescu implicitly rebuked the Soviet Union for breaking a number of economic agreements in efforts to influence Rumanian policies. During the conference he also "yielded" to a "unanimous request" that he take over the top government position, President of the State Council, along with his party post. This was part of a broad

program of measures aimed to fuse power between the Party and Government, "confirmed" immediately afterward by a meeting of the Grand National Assembly. Observers saw two objectives behind the move: centralization of political power to counterbalance recent decentralization of control of the economy; and increased stature for Ceausescu in his international role.

3. Serious internal dissension is evident in recent developments in Czechoslovakia and the USSR, while the conflict in China continues to spread, despite Peking's "moderation" line. Against a background of steady deterioration of the Czech economy and stirred by the courageous stand of a large group of intellectuals against regime policies at the Prague Writers Congress in June and the student riots in October, general dissatisfaction with the Party-State leadership has reportedly become widespread within the power structure as well as among the public. Observers had predicted top-level personnel changes at a Central Committee plenum scheduled to convene on 13 December, and speculation was heightened when Soviet Party Chief Brezhnev made an unexpected visit, obviously hastily arranged, to Prague on 8-9 December. A last-minute postponement of the plenum for a week seemed to confirm the forecasts of serious troubles.

Meanwhile, dissident intellectuals in Moscow told reporters that secret trials were scheduled to begin 11 December against Ginzburg, Galanskov and several other young writers who had been held incommunicado since January, presumably for emulating and defending the celebrated martyrs Sinyavsky and Daniel. They described petitions on behalf of these writers which had been signed by large numbers of Soviet intellectuals of various professions during the past year. Also, the publication in Paris of a collection of Ukrainian manuscripts smuggled out of that largest of the non-Russian republics of the USSR revealed widespread intellectual dissidence in the Ukraine which is further intensified by a strong nationalistic resentment against Moscow's rule. (Latest reports indicate that the Moscow trials did not start on 11 December, but no further details are known.)

Soviet diplomat 'meddled' in Indian elections

From Krishan Bhatia
Hindustan Times Correspondent

Washington, Dec. 3—Shouting "Spy" is a game that two can play. When questioned about alleged revelations made by Mr. John Smith, a former U.S. Embassy employee who has defected to the Soviet Union, U.S. authorities suggest that Mr. Smith's statement recklessly hurling espionage charges against the U.S. is indeed a hurriedly contrived device on the part of the Soviet Government to draw the attention away from the disclosures made some weeks ago by a Soviet agent, Mr. Y. N. Loginov.

Mr. Loginov, described as a

K.G.B. agent, was arrested in South Africa and, according to reports appearing in several European and American newspapers, he has furnished a fairly detailed account of Soviet operations in India, especially the Soviet effort to interfere with the last general elections.

Mr. Loginov has described how a high-ranking K.G.B. officer, whose real name was Mr. Lyudin, was sent last year as a political counsellor in the Soviet Embassy in Delhi where, under the assumed name of Mr. Yuri Modin, he organized Soviet Union's "election campaign" in India. Mr. Loginov has reportedly mentioned many Soviet and In-

dian names.

That Moscow meddled in the Indian elections was confirmed by the Indian Government's own inquiries. Authorities here tend to measure every Indian attitude towards the U.S. against the Indian attitude in similar circumstances towards the Soviet Union. Consequently they are upset that the alleged disclosures by a former American Embassy clerk should receive so much attention in India, while attacks on the Indian Government and leaders by "Radio Peace and Progress" of Moscow and other Soviet activities such as attempts to influence the Indian election have gone virtually unnoticed.

HINDUSTAN TIMES

1 December 1967

PIB to work for Russian publicity

Hindustan Times Correspondent

New Delhi, Nov. 30—By a contract with the Soviet news and feature agency, Novosti, the Press Information Bureau of the Government of India will circulate Russian publicity material and photographs to Indian newspapers, a job hitherto done by the Information Department of the Russian Embassy here.

The PIB undertaking, which might be considered unusual at any time, is particularly intriguing now because Novosti is among the half a dozen Soviet agencies responsible for propaganda tirades against the Government of India through Moscow Radio's special overseas service, called Radio Peace and Progress.

In its latest broadcasts on India, Radio Peace and Progress is vying with Peking Radio in heaping abuses on the Government of India for the dismissal last Tuesday of the Communist-dominated West Bengal Government.

Characterizing the overthrow of the UF Ministry as the handiwork of "Indian reactionaries and monopolists," Radio Peace and Progress in a broadcast on Nov. 22 said: "This stand of the Governor (of West Bengal) reflects demands of the monopolists and land-owners in the State."

Peking Radio's attack on Mrs. Gandhi's Government, broadcast on Nov. 23, is also couched in similar language. The radio said: "India's Congress-controlled reactionary Central Government ordered the dissolution of the West Bengal State Government on Tuesday." It went on to tell

its listeners not to shed too many tears over the dismissal of the UF Government and with appropriate references to Maoist jargon said revolution could not be achieved through the "parliamentary road."

Radio Peace and Progress had hitherto listed Swatantra leaders Rajagopalachari and N. G. Ranga, Jan Sangh leader Balraj Madhok and Congress leaders like Mr. S. K. Patil and Mr. Atulja Ghosh among "Indian reactionaries." In its recent broadcasts it has enlarged the list by including Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai and Home Minister Chavan.

Mrs. Indira Gandhi has not yet been mentioned by name but the Union Government as a whole and some of the policies with which she is directly associated have been specially mentioned by Radio Peace and Progress as evidence of India's subservience to "reactionary and monopoly" pressure. The radio has also faithfully echoed the threats of violence, such as burning of Calcutta because of the overthrow of the UF Government, issued by West Bengal Communists.

Poll campaign

Radio Peace and Progress started attacking the Congress for the first time during the last election campaign and lent open support to Communist candidates and to a few Congressmen with pronounced pro-Moscow leanings.

This led to a protest by the Government of India to the Russian Embassy here and also by the Indian Ambassador in Moscow to the Russian Foreign Office. The Soviet Government did not own direct responsibility for the broadcasts. It told the Government of India that Radio Peace and Progress was controlled by "private organizations" like Novosti, Russian Union of Journalists, Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relation with Foreign Countries, All-Union Society of Knowledge, Soviet Peace Committee, Soviet Women's Committee and Committee of Soviet Youth Organizations.

These so-called private organizations, according to Moscow, had hired certain frequencies of Moscow Radio for their broadcasts. Although the Government of India does not accept the lame excuses made by the Russian Government, it has decided, on the advice of the External Affairs Ministry, not to pursue the matter further.

WFTU cable

Encouraged possibly by Moscow's open criticism of Mrs. Gandhi's Government, even Czechoslovakia allowed the Prague-based World Federation of Trade Unions to send a cable to Mrs. Gandhi on Nov. 24 condemning in violent language New Delhi's supposed "reactionary" action in West Bengal.

The message said: "WFTU expresses grave concern at the latest developments in India resulting in attacks on democratic rights in some States, especially West Bengal. WFTU strongly condemns display of military force, suppression of democratic

liberties, enforcement of prohibitory orders, curfew in industrial areas, arrests of over 1,000 trade union leaders and other militants, firing resulting in deaths and injuries to many in West Bengal to suppress justified protest of workers and people through strikes and demonstrations. WFTU demands respect for democratic norms of life, restoration of democratic liberties and release of all those arrested."

The message has been circulated to newspapers here by the secretary of the All-India Trade Union Congress.

India-Soviet Press Link Hit in Delhi

By Bernard D. Nossiter
Washington Post Foreign Service

NEW DELHI, Dec. 4—The Indian government's deal to swap propaganda with Russia came under heavy fire today in Parliament and the press.

Some lawmakers from the government's own Congress Party joined in the attack,

which was led by conservatives and socialists. One legislator, an independent, charged that the arrangement makes India a "broker for the Soviet Union."

The accord was secretly signed last September by the Indian Press Information Bureau and Novosti, a Russian feature news service. It provides that each will supply to its own country's newspapers articles, photographs and background material that both produce.

Several of the plan's critics recalled that a parlia-

mentary group had blocked a proposed deal under which the Voice of America was to broadcast for a few hours over a transmitter to be donated to the Indians.

The legislators were particularly incensed over the government's partnership with Novosti. That agency sponsors and supplies material to "Radio Peace and Progress," a Moscow station which broadcasts attacks here on conservative Indian political leaders.

Information Minister K. K. Shah replied that Novosti has nothing to do with

"Peace and Progress." In fact, Indian officials have privately admitted that they discussed the station's virulent broadcasts before signing the contract with Novosti.

The real motive for the deal was probably revealed by Shah's deputy, Mrs. Mrandini Satpathy, who observed that the Western press was private. In other words, the Publicity Ministry here concluded that the only way it could get its material into the controlled Soviet press was by striking a deal with a Soviet agency.

WASHINGTON POST
2 December 1967

India and Soviets to Trade Propaganda

By Bernard D. Nossiter
Washington Post Foreign Service

NEW DELHI, Dec. 1—The Indian government and a Soviet press agency have signed a singular agreement to exchange propaganda materials for periodicals in the two countries.

Under the deal, which was disclosed by the Hindustan Times today, the Indians and Russians are swapping articles, photographs and "background" pamphlets. These will be supplied to newspapers and others that request them.

A separate annex to the agreement calls on the Soviet agency, Novosti, to send the Indian materials directly to 500 Russian journals. There is no reciprocal obligation for the Indians.

Link to Radio

The fact that Novosti is the Russian signatory has aroused particular interest here. The agency is the principal sponsor and chief source of mate-

rials for "Radio Peace and Progress." This is a Moscow station that has been broadcasting programs beamed here in English and Hindi that attack conservative Indian political leaders.

"Radio Peace and Progress" broadcasts were so virulent that India protested to Moscow last summer over their tone. The station's chief target has been the United States and its "reactionary" Indian "Lackeys".

The Soviet Union contends that the station, like Novosti, is an unofficial organization. New Delhi decided not to press its protest in deference to its policy of friendship with the Russians.

The propaganda exchange agreement went into effect early last month, just in time for the 50th anniversary celebration of the Bolshevik Revolution.

Innocuous Material

A sampling of the Russian-

supplied materials turned up innocuous items. New Delhi has been receiving articles on "The First Russian Revolution: Its Goals and Tasks" and "Pre-Sputnik History of Soviet Rocketry." Novosti specializes in feature articles rather than spot, or current, news.

Indian officials say that the arrangement is designed to create a favorable picture of their nation in "all friendly countries." Similar deals are under discussion, officials report, with Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and West Germany.

The government here says that this is a one-sided deal under which India gains the major benefits. This is argued on the grounds that Novosti must actively disseminate New Delhi's materials while India is simply a passive repository for the Russian matter. Officials point out that the library of the government's Press Information Bureau also contains articles and pamphlets from the United States Information Service and the British

Information Service.

Some Indian journalists, however, are highly critical of the arrangement. They say that Indian newspapers will now request material about the Soviet Union from the Press Information Bureau and receive documents made in Moscow. The fact that they will come from an Indian government agency, it is said, will give them an official blessing that they otherwise would lack.

American diplomats here were upset over the first report of the deal, but when they learned that India was only required to fulfill requests and not actively distribute propaganda, they concluded that there was nothing to be alarmed about. The diplomats contended that all journals in the Soviet Union are government controlled and that India was simply plugging itself into a channel of distribution for them.

Bombay (PTI)
4 December 1967

MINISTER SHAH DEFENDS AGREEMENT WITH NOVOSTI

New Delhi--Indian Minister for Information and Broadcasting K. K. Shah strongly defended in parliament today the agreement between the government's Press Information Bureau--PIB--and the Soviet news agency NOVOSTI. He said it is in no way different from existing arrangements with other information services like the USIS and BIS.

Referring to a volley of angry questions following a call of attention notice by a socialist member, Shah said the only difference is while arrangements with other information services are on the basis an "oral understanding," that with NOVOSTI is in writing.

Under the agreement dated 16 September, Shah said, PIB would supply to NOVOSTI feature articles, background material, and photographs for distribution to newspapers and periodicals published in the Soviet Union which are interested and also use the material for reference purposes. He denied that the agreement envisaged circulation of Russian publicity material and photographs in India through PIB.

Opposition members hurled angry questions objecting to the agreement and pointing to the "anti-Indian" propaganda carried on by the station Radio Peace and Progress, and demanded that minister resign. When repeatedly asked who made the decision--the cabinet, the minister, or the department concerned, Shah, amidst an uproar, replied that it was finalized by the principal information officer when he visited Moscow. He signed it only after NOVOSTI accepted his refusal to distribute Soviet material through PIB.

Shah readily agreed with opposition members that it is no business of Radio Peace and Progress to indulge in anti-Indian propaganda, but, he said, NOVOSTI has nothing to do with Radio Peace and Progress. However, this is a broader question which should be taken up with the government. At one point, Shah told an angry opposition member that he is prepared to enter into similar agreements with any other country.

Ham Barua, a socialist, described NOVOSTI as "almost a counterpart of CIA." He said when there is a proposal to have an agreement with the "Voice of America" or to have a joint Indian-U.S. education foundation, there is "a lot of talk" here. Why was an agreement reached with NOVOSTI when Radio Peace and Progress "out Peking-ed Peking" in abusing India and its leaders, he asked. There is no other government, he said, which undertakes publicity for another country.

Another parliament member quoted some of the "insinuations" made by Radio Peace and Progress against Indian leaders and asked why PIB "should oblige to circulate such material." Asked whether the government would reconsider the matter in view of the critical comments in some of the leading newspapers in the country, Shah said it is not correct that all newspapers have criticized the agreement. He was sure that the newspapers which had criticized it would change their view after going through the agreement, he said. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, a member of the rightwing Jan Sangh, objected to the government's not taking the house into confidence. It raised the matter only after getting the news from newspapers, he said.

	Juan Jose Arreola	Novelist
	Ermilo Abreu Gomez	Writer
	Victor Flores Olea	Sociological Professor
	Adolfo Sanchez Vazquez	Professor at the National
		Autonomous University of Mexico
Peru:	Gerardo Chavez	Painter
	Mario Vargas Llosa	Novelist
	Emilio Adolfo Westphalen	Poet
Chile:	Enrique Lynn	Journalist
	Jorge Edwards	Novelist
	Jorge Diaz	Novelist
Netherlands:	J. Zimmerman	Sociologist
	Harry Mulish	Journalist
	Joris Ivens	Motion Picture Director
Guinea:	Condetto Nenekhaly	Poet and Dramatist
	Keita Sididi	Philosophy Professor, Writer
	Choris Sekou	Presidential Representative
		from Guinea
West Germany:	Peter Weiss	Dramatist
	Arthur Kastler	Writer
East Germany:	Ludwig Renn	Novelist
	Walter Kaufmann	Novelist
Haiti:	Rene Despestre	Poet
	Hernes Télemaque	Painter
El Salvador:	Claribel Alegria	Novelist
	Roque Dalton	Poet
Puerto Rico:	Manuel Maldonado Denis	Novelist, Essayist
	Emilio Diaz	Novelist
Gautemala:	Manuel Galich	Novelist
	Luis Cardoza Y Aragon	Writer
USSR:	V. Golobin	Science Professor
	Kirilov Urjmov	Science Professor
Uruguay:	Mario Benedetti	Novelist
	Alejandro Romualdo	Novelist
Japan:	Susumo Hani	Motion Picture Director
	Tahakai Misago	Musician
Sweden:	Gunilla Palmstiern	Theatrical Scenographer
	Gus Jomsson	Biologist

Partial list of invitees to the Cultural Congress of Havana
4-11 January 1968

<u>Country</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Occupation</u>
France:	Simone De Beauvoir	Novelist and Critic
	Jean Paul Sartre	Philosopher and Novelist
	Madeleine Renaud	Artist
	Jean Marie Domenach	Writer
	Natalie Serrault	Novelist
	Maurice Duverger	Sociologist
	K.S. Karol	Essayist
	Michel Butor	Poet
	Geore Balandier	Economist
	Marguerite Duras	Novelist
	Francois Maspero	Editor
	Maurice Sine	Novelist and Writer
	Max Paul Fuchet	Journalist and Writer
	Jacques Berques	Sociologist
	Eduardo Pignon	Painter
	Jean Sahl	Professor
	Claude Gallimard	Editor
Claude Couffon	Poet	
Spain:	Grabiell Celaya	Poet
	Alfonso Sastre	Playwright
	Jose Marie Caballero Bonald	Novelist and Playwright
	Luis Goytisolo	Novelist
	Juan Antonio Bardem	Motion Picture Director
	Jose Marie Castiell	Essayist and Journalist
	Jose Moreno Galvan	Literary Critic and Novelist
	Antonio Ezeiza	Motion Picture Director
	Antonio Valente	Journalist and Novelist
	Francisco Fernandez	Essayist and Critic
Ramon Pelegero	Art Critic	
Jose Bergamin	Writer	
Italy:	Alba De Cespedes	Novelist
	Lelio Brasio	Essayist
	Luca Pavolin	Director of RINASCITA
	Rossana Rosanda	Essayist
	Angelo Quatrecchi	Journalist and Novelist
	Leo Matarasso	Novelist
	Luigi Nono	Writer
	Serverino Del Sasso	Writer
	Francesco Rossi	Motion Picture Director
Mexico:	Emilio Carballido	Playwright
	Ricardo Pozas	University Professor
	Federico Alvarez	Critic

Argentina:	Leopoldo Marechal Julio Cortazar	Poet Novelist
United Kingdom:	Evan Phillips Robert Read	Art Critic Motion Picture Critic
Angola:	Mario De Andrade	Essayist and Novelist
Austria:	Ernest Fisher	Philosophy Professor
Brazil:	Thiago De Miello	Novelist
Colombia:	Jaime Mejia	Novelist
Czechoslovakia:	Jen Drda	Novelist
Egypt:	Salem Redesele	Painter
Hungary:	Laszlo Andras	Literary Critic, Essayist
Mali:	Amadou Hampate	Linguist
Martinique:	Aime Cesaire	Poet
Pakistan:	Faiz Ahmed Faiz	Poet, Novelist
Rumania:	Daire Novacesnu	Writer, Literary Critic
Senegal:	Sembene Ousmanne	Writer, Motion Picture Director
Venezuela:	Peron Erminy	Poet

WASHINGTON POST
4 December 1967

Cuba to Let More From U.S. Leave

Reuters

HAVANA, Dec. 3—A group of American citizens resident in Cuba will be repatriated Tuesday by special flight via Mexico, it was learned here today.

They will be accompanied by their immediate Cuban-born relatives, sources said.

The future of about 600 U.S. citizens living here has been subject to talks and snags for two years and it was not known how many will leave

under the present flight arrangement.

The majority of American residents here are old and some have been in Cuba for 50 years.

In August, 1966, Cuba apparently ruled out any speedy repatriation when it announced that U.S. citizens would have to wait until all Cubans entitled to leave the country under the Varadero-Miami exile airlift agreement had gone—possibly a question of several years.

But the government partially reversed its decision in December, 1966, when it allowed one plane load to leave via Merida, Mexico, following an appeal by Mexican President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz.

MIAMI HERALD
1 December 1967

Gratitude Of The Refugees

THEY get off the plane that brought them from Red Cuba, kneel reverently and kiss the soil of the United States.

It doesn't happen every time the Freedom Airlift lands at Opa-locka twice a day, five days a week. But the eye-moistening gesture can be seen from time to time as arriving refugees spontaneously show how they feel about escaping from communism to this land of ours.

Their thankfulness will be expressed formally today as Cuban-American Day, the second anniversary of the relative-to-relative airlift. Since Dec. 1, 1965, some 87,000 Cuban refugees have arrived by this route. More than three-fourths of them have gone to the 49 other states, including one to Alaska.

They are among the 266,339 fugitives from Cuba who have registered at the Freedom Tower on Biscayne Blvd. since January, 1961.

The first anniversary of the airlift prompted Manuel J. Reyes of WTVJ, in a speech to that day's newcomers, to suggest yearly observance of Dec. 1 as "the day for Cuban people in exile and elsewhere to acknowledge to the U.S.

and its people their thanks and appreciation."

The idea was taken up by Miami city officials and by Cuban-American Solidarity, an exile group which holds that "gratitude is one of the most beautiful virtues of both men and nations."

So at 9 this morning the newest refugees will hear about the anniversary from Mr. Reyes and Henry Taylor, director of the State Department's Cuban affairs office in Miami.

At 8 tonight in the Dade County Auditorium, Cubans here will gather for a civic-cultural program during which the solidarity organization will present a plaque to a representative of the President of the U.S. "symbolic of the gratitude of the Cuban people to the people of the U.S."

The ceremonies should warm the hearts of U.S. citizens who are giving a place of refuge to men, women and children whose homeland has been enchained by communism for nearly nine years.

NEW YORK TIMES
3 December 1967

AIRLIFT OF CUBANS FINISHES 2D YEAR

90,000 Have Come to U.S.
Under Program Since '65

Special to The New York Times

MIAMI, Dec. 2—With no end in sight, the airlift of Cuban refugees sponsored by the United States marked its second anniversary this week.

About 90,000 refugees have arrived here since the Varadero-to-Miami air shuttle began Nov. 30, 1965.

Twice a day, five times a week, a plane with about 85 refugees lands at the Miami Airport. It brings mostly children and adults in their 40's or older. Men between 15 and 27 as well as technicians and other specialists have been barred from the airlift by the Government of Premier Fidel Castro.

Since 1959, when Premier Castro came to power, more than 350,000 Cubans are estimated to have left their homeland. Over 300,000 of them live in the United States.

Government and Private Aid

Once in the United States, the refugees, who are permitted to leave with only a few clothes, are assisted by government and private welfare agencies. Over 70 per cent of the new arrivals are resettled throughout the United States.

The Cuban refugee program, created in 1961 and administered by the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, has been providing financial aid, hospitalization, surplus food and other social services to the needy Cubans.

Some \$300-million has been appropriated through the end of the current fiscal year for the program.

By and large, Cuban refugees have achieved economic independence on their own or have requested assistance for only a short period, the program's officials here said.

They pointed out that whereas in 1962 over 38,000 welfare checks had been sent out monthly to Cuban refugees in the Miami area, today the number is 9,500, and the recipients are mostly elderly and unemployable persons.

LE MONDE

7 December 1967

PLUSIEURS PERSONNALITES FRANÇAISES ÉCRIVENT A M. KOSSYGUINE

Vingt-huit intellectuels ont été arrêtés à Leningrad en février et mars derniers. Une première session de leur procès s'est tenue, mais a été interrompue. Ce procès doit se rouvrir prochainement, à huis clos. Professeurs à l'université de Leningrad, critiques littéraires, poètes, ces prévenus ont tous entre trente et trente-cinq ans. On cite parmi eux le professeur Ogourtzov, titulaire de la chaire de tibétain, Michel Saado et Ivanov, tous deux assistants d'histoire, Eugène Vaguine, secrétaire du comité de rédaction chargé de la nouvelle édition critique des œuvres complètes de Dostoïevsky, Kirillov et Vakhtine. On ignore le chef d'accusation. Plusieurs personnalités françaises ont envoyé la lettre suivante à M. Kossyguine, chef du gouvernement soviétique :

« Profondément alarmés par l'arrestation en février 1967 de vingt-huit universitaires de Leningrad et par le mystère total

qui entoure leur procès, nous vous prions d'user de votre influence pour que soient accordées aux accusés toutes les garanties de défense prévues par la loi. Nous voulons croire sans fondement les rumeurs selon lesquelles la plupart des accusés en instance de jugement encourraient de lourdes condamnations, pouvant aller pour certains jusqu'à la peine capitale. Soyez assuré qu'aucun motif politique n'inspire notre intervention : elle nous est dictée par le sentiment de solidarité qui unit les intellectuels d'Occident à leurs confrères soviétiques. »

Ont signé cette lettre : MM. Louis Armand, le pasteur Boegner, André François-Poncet, François Mauriac, Jean Rostand, Jacques Rueff, membres de l'Académie française ; MM. Raymond Aron, Gabriel Le Brat, Gabriel Marcel, Marcel Rousset, membre de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques ; Mme Sophie Laffitte, professeur à l'université de Paris ; MM. Pierre Emmanuel, homme de lettres, et Pierre Laffitte, sous-directeur de l'Ecole des mines de Paris.

LE MONDE

7 December 1967

L'AUTEUR D'UN LIVRE BLANC SUR L'AFFAIRE SINIAVSKI-DANIEL VA ÊTRE JUGÉ A MOSCOU

Moscou, 6 décembre (A.F.P.). — Un nouveau procès politico-littéraire, où le principal accusé sera le poète Alexandro Guinzbourg, s'ouvrira à Moscou dans les tout prochains jours, apprend-on dans les milieux est-européens.

Deux autres jeunes gens, Youri Galantchouk et Alexis Dobrovolsky, devraient comparaître aux côtés de Guinzbourg. Tous trois furent arrêtés, en même temps que cinq étudiants, dans les jours qui suivirent une manifestation à laquelle ils participèrent, le 22 janvier 1967 à Moscou, pour défendre les écrivains André Siniaevski et Youri Daniel, condamnés en février 1966. Voici les renseignements que l'on possède sur le sort de ces personnes :

— Victor Tachist fut jugé et condamné en août 1967 ;

— L'étudiante Lachkova fut jugée et relaxée le même mois ;

— Les étudiants Vladimir Boukovsky, Vadim Delaunay et Eugène Kouchev furent, à l'issue d'un procès de quatre jours, le premier condamné le 1^{er} septembre 1967 à trois ans d'emprisonnement ; les deux autres libérés.

Alors que Boukovsky, Delaunay et Kouchev avaient été jugés par l'équivalent d'un tribunal correctionnel pour « hooliganisme », troubles sur la voie publique et opposition aux forces de l'ordre, le procès Guinzbourg-Galantchouk-Dobrovolsky revêtirait un caractère politique plus marqué.

Alexandre Guinzbourg, trente-deux ans, est l'auteur d'un Livre blanc sur l'affaire Siniaevski-Daniel et le chef de file d'un groupe littéraire d'avant-garde semi-clandestin qui s'intitule S.M.O.G.

Youri Galantchouk est le rédacteur en chef de la revue clandestine *Phœnix*.

THE TAN-ZAM RAILWAY -- A CHINESE TROJAN HORSE IN AFRICA

The announcement of the aid agreement signed last September between Communist China, Tanzania and Zambia on the construction of the Tan-Zam railway provides a classic example of the use of economic aid as an adjunct of Communist China's expansionist foreign policy. Regardless of whether China ever builds the railway, she has already gained a great deal of propaganda mileage among the developing countries by her seemingly generous offer.

Whether or not Communist China actually intends to send thousands of Red Guard "volunteers" to Tanzania and Zambia to work on the railway and then to settle down in Africa, the apprehensions on the part of most Africans that they might indeed do so should be goaded by continuing speculation along this line.

A major objective is to shake the complacency -- to some degree engendered by voluminous Western (and often exaggerated) reporting of China's setbacks in Asia and Africa during the last two years -- on the part of governments which ingenuously believe that

- a. they can contain or "handle" the Chicom ideological and subversive activities which invariably accompany Chicom economic and political efforts in foreign countries;
- b. the excesses of the Red Guards and the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" have so damaged China that she is no longer the menace that she had threatened to be; or that
- c. the Chinese have demonstrated such clumsiness and insensitivity in their cultural and diplomatic relations in seeking to induce many African, Asian and Latin American leaders to embrace the Thoughts of Mao and to endorse their anti-Soviet and anti-US positions, that Chinese prestige has been irreparably reduced.

To explain the willingness of the Chinese Communists to undertake this very expensive project, audiences should be reminded of the vast natural resources of Central Africa with its copper, gold, diamonds and other minerals, as well as its natural agricultural wealth. A Chinese foothold in Tanzania-Zambia, enhanced by a modern Tan-Zam railway, would place this region within easy reach. The importance to Communist China of the Congo, the world's largest known source of cobalt, should be emphasized.

Since the West also gets much uranium from the Congo, this helps explain Peking's (and Moscow's) interest in promoting revolution there. Exploitation of this aspect, however, is a two-edged sword. It should be discussed in terms of Western overt business agreements based on mutually satisfactory terms as against subversive incitement to revolution for material and strategic gains and/or denial of strategic items to the West. (In about 1961 the Sino-Soviet split cut China off from

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January 1968

The Tan-Zam Railway

After prolonged negotiations and conflicting reports over who would build the controversial Tanzania-Zambia (Tan-Zam) railroad, President Kaunda of Zambia announced in June 1967 shortly after his return from Peking that Communist China had agreed to finance and build the railway. This was confirmed when the New China News Agency (NCNA) reported that an agreement between the Governments of Communist China, Tanzania and Zambia "on the construction of the Tan-Zam railway" was signed in Peking on 5 September 1967 in the presence of Premier Chou En-lai.

The resulting publicity and flurry of rumors about the possibility of greatly expanded Chinese Communist aid, to be attended by an influx of thousands of "volunteer" Chinese laborers to Africa, have brought into sharp focus Chicom foreign aid activity as it reflects Chicom foreign policy. The Tan-Zam agreement is clearly designed to lift sinking Chinese Communist prestige in the developing world while simultaneously affording Peking new opportunities for increasing its influence and enlarging its presence in Africa.

For example, on 19 July 1967 the Hong Kong Chinese-language newspaper Tin Tin Yat Pao stated that a wall poster seen in Peking by a foreign businessman was recruiting Chinese volunteers to work on the Tan-Zam railroad. Plots of land in Africa were being offered to the volunteers as a reward for their services, according to the article, which quoted the posters as asserting "Africa is ripe for revolution," and pointing out that "Africa offers the opportunity for revolutionary Chinese youth to migrate and help their African comrades carry out socialist construction based on the teachings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung."

On 2 September 1967, the Times of Zambia reported that posters had appeared in Peking appealing for Red Guard volunteers to go to Tanzania "to work for a few years" building the line. Similar stories were published on 7 September in the Rhodesia Herald and on 29 September in the Wall Street Journal. The Hong Kong newspaper Wah Kiu Yat Pao on 21 October devoted a long article to the decision of People's China to build the railway and quoted from a leaflet issued by the Red Guards. This stressed the importance of the project and stated that several thousand volunteers are required in order to make a success of the project, which will not be completed for several years. Mention of the wall posters was also made in the October 1967 edition of African Review.

Brief History

The Tan-Zam railway project is a long-cherished dream of Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda. It is to provide a 1,000 mile rail link between Zambia's rich copperbelt and the Indian Ocean port of Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania, which will free land-locked Zambia from dependence on white-ruled regimes for an outlet to the sea. Nyerere believes that by lessening Zambia's dependence on the white-minority governments of southern Africa, the railroad will further the campaign to liberate that area.

The possibility of sharing in Zambia's copper revenues and better communications to support the development plans for poverty-stricken Tanzania is also attractive to Nyerere. With borders on the Congo and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia before independence in 1964) depends almost entirely on Rhodesian railroads for its trade with the world. Since Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965 and the United Nations' boycott of the Ian Smith government, Kaunda has felt with mounting urgency the necessity of alternative routes for Zambia's copper exports and oil imports.

Cost estimates and feasibility reports of the proposed route, which transits very difficult terrain, vary widely. Efforts to interest Western powers in financing the project were unsuccessful. The World Bank in 1964 concluded that the railway would cost some \$162 million and would operate at a loss until about 1990; later the cost estimate was revised upward and the Bank rejected the railway idea in favor of road improvements. President Nyerere solicited aid for the project from the major Communist powers. The Soviet Union flatly refused to consider building the railroad or even to conduct a survey. China showed a little more interest, and sent a 12-man team which in May 1966 completed a preliminary study of the Tanzanian portion of the line which proved to be totally inadequate, and in fact, laughable.

Political Complications

Apart from extremely complex economic considerations, the Tan-Zam project has been enmeshed in a welter of political issues since its conception. It has been a pawn in cold war rivalries, in the Sino-Soviet competition for influence in Africa, in the "liberation" movements, and in the maneuvering of the African leaders most directly concerned with East African political and economic policies.

China's subversive activities in Africa, her support for revolutionary violence, and the hard line of her policies generally antagonized many African governments. The recent excesses of the Cultural Revolution, particularly the messianic zeal of the Red Guards, further alienated most African opinion and did not go unnoticed in either Zambia or Tanzania; in July 1967 strong protests were voiced against Chinese distribution of Mao Tse-tung badges at trade fairs in Dar-es-Salaam and Ndola.

President Kaunda was greatly impressed by the Chinese when he visited Peking. However, he is concerned about controlling Chinese interference in Zambia's domestic affairs, and insists that the number of Chinese sent to Zambia in connection with the Tan-Zam project be limited and their movements restricted. Even if Peking should agree to these terms, large numbers of engineers and technicians would nevertheless enter Zambia, and undoubtedly vastly more Chinese laborers than Kaunda would choose.

Tanzania has been receptive to communist assistance, partly because Nyerere has felt compelled to assert his country's neutralism. He has found dealing with Communist China more profitable than with the Soviets or East Germans since the Chinese often cover all local costs on project, offer generous terms on loans, and occasionally extend outright cash grants. Until recently there has been no indication of agreement on Soviet projects because the latter insist on relatively harsh terms and feasibility studies. Of five basic Chinese projects agreed upon, one, a broadcast station, has been completed and a second, a vertically-integrated textile mill, is nearing completion. It is obvious that the Chinese have been more flexible than other parts of the Communist World in offering aid to Tanzania and that, as a result, their technicians have come in growing numbers. Despite some qualms, Nyerere appears to accept this situation as a condition of assistance. He also apparently still feels as he did in June 1965 when he stated: "Tanzania is not a puppet of East or West. We will accept aid from anybody as long as it does not interfere with our policy."

The history of Chinese Communist aid programs reveals that there has always been a discrepancy between aid offered and aid actually received, primarily because of the involved way in which the Chinese negotiate and their insistence that the technical personnel whom they provide be paid out of the aid grant. In addition, much aid is tied to the purchase of Chinese goods. Developing countries generally demand food and manufactured goods, and these are things that China is short of. Very often, the products supplied have been of inferior quality or items not in demand.

Acceptance of a Chinese aid project usually means acceptance of many technicians and unskilled laborers -- an economic necessity since China must substitute "labor intensive methods" for modern machinery. At the same time this provides on-the-spot agents of subversion.

The Chinese Offer

Although the Chinese are apparently willing to construct and finance the completed railroad project (Western estimates currently put the cost at over \$300 million, with 6-9 years for construction), the September 5 agreement now appears to have covered only surveys and designs for which the Chinese have pledged a \$14 million interest-free loan. The amount, provisions, and method of repayment of the loan are to be decided after the Chinese have completed the preparatory work.

The offer of aid, a large one by any standards, is unprecedented for China, and would represent by far China's single largest foreign aid project to date. It would be the third biggest foreign aid project in all Africa, exceeded only by the Aswan High Dam and the Volta Dam in Ghana. If the Chinese do eventually construct the railway, they

would be undertaking a project which could equal one-third of their total economic aid commitments since 1956 or match almost all of their aid expenditures to date. Since the inception of the Chinese aid program in 1956, Peking's total worldwide commitments amount to slightly more than \$1 billion while actual expenditures were only some \$400 million. Annual commitments reached a peak of \$310 million in 1964 but averaged about \$130 million in 1965 and 1966. Drawings on aid since 1964 have averaged about \$75 million annually.

Expenditures for the first half of 1967 amount to almost \$50 million, indicating that the aid program has not yet been affected by the Cultural Revolution... adding to other more obvious signs that Chinese Communist foreign ambitions, in the wake of recent political setbacks in Asia and Africa, have perhaps become more selective and more dramatic, but no less determined.

Communist China is technically capable of constructing the Tan-Zam, although the state of China's own internal railway system, with its delays, poor workmanship and other shortcomings, is hardly a recommendation. Comparison can be made, however, to the Pao-Chi Cheng-tu railway linking Shensi and Szechwan Provinces, a 424 mile line spanning rugged terrain not unlike that of the Tan-Zam route. Reportedly the line was opened in July 1965 six years after the initial engineering survey was undertaken. In the first five months after its opening, 40,000 workers were employed repairing defects. China is said to have used 15,000 technicians and 150,000 coolies to build the line.

If China builds the Tan-Zam according to the same intensive labor methods, at least 450,000 men and 45,000 technicians would be required to complete the Tan-Zam in four years. If the labor force were restricted to the size of the force which built the Pao-chi Cheng-tu line -- i.e., 165,000 people -- the Tan-Zam would take about 12 years to complete.

There are signs that both Nyerere and Kaunda nurse hopes that the West, through an international consortium, might yet agree to finance the Tan-Zam project. There are doubts in many quarters that after the internal economic and social upheavals caused by the Cultural Revolution China can support such a massive expenditure of monies and technical manpower urgently needed for China's domestic development.

It seems probable that whatever agreement was signed in Peking, it contains a liberal escape clause should any party feel, after the two years or so it will take to complete the preparatory studies, that the Tan-Zam railway would not be a practical engineering or economic proposition -- or even a political one.

Communist China Calls for Volunteers to Go to Africa -
To Infiltrate Tanzania -
Pressures Red Guards and Offers Land as Enticement

A Singapore businessman who has just returned from Peking said that he saw appeal in the big character posters in the capital for volunteers to go to Tanzania to build the 1,300-mile long Tanzania-Zambia railroad. Plots of land in Africa were mentioned as reward for services.

According to his notes, one poster carried the following message: "Volunteers, go to Tanzania! The time for revolution in Africa is now ripe! Africa has offered the revolutionary youths of China an opportunity to emigrate and assist African comrades to engage in socialist construction in accordance with the teachings of Chairman Mao and the principles of the Chinese proletarian cultural revolution. The Chinese People's Republic has accepted Tanzania's request to build a railroad. In order to accomplish the project, volunteers will be chosen from among the thousands of Red Guards to go to Tanzania to work for a few years. The success of Africa's revolution will be the volunteers' reward. All Chinese immigrants will be given plots of land and housing for their dependents. The Chinese people have in the past more than once migrated to foreign lands and many among them have gone on to become leaders in local communities, becoming much more prominent than the indigenous people. The Chinese youths of today have accepted the challenge to make revolution in Africa and have volunteered to bring our revolutionary experiences to a land where we are welcome as brothers and comrades in arms."

The businessman, who refused to reveal his name, said that he saw many people reading the posters. Some were puzzled, some others raised a number of questions. "What is Africa like? How much land is given to be farmed? What crops can be cultivated? How long must one have served in order to qualify?"

Communist China has agreed to build a railroad for an East African country that will cost from \$25 million to \$50 million. According to British and World Bank estimates, however, the rail line will consume from \$100 million to \$200 million. There have been reports that Communist China has suggested that Chinese workers be sent to Tanzania and Zambia to reduce the construction costs. Foreign dispatches said that when Zambian President Kaunda visited Peking recently his hosts expressed desire to foot the bill. On March 9 President Kaunda had announced that, although Communist China was willing to give a massive economic aid, he was not ready to deal with Peking. But, following his return from a visit to Communist China, Kaunda declared in Lusaka that if Western nations could not come up with superior terms he would accept Peking's aid. Judging from the tone of the big character posters, it is possible that President Kaunda may already have accepted the aid.

It is learned that Communist China got involved in the railroad construction in the February of 1965 when Tanzanian President, Nyerere was visiting Peking. At that time Communist China had made no definite commitments, but soon was in a great hurry to send a surveying team to Tanzania. If the project should materialize, Zambia's copper could be directly transported to Dar-es-Salaam, without having to go through Rhodesia and Mozambique, which Zambia regards as being hostile to her.

Reliable, well-informed sources said that the proposed railroad will start from Dar-es-Salaam to Tunduma, close by the Zambian border, and then to Mikumi, where the largest station will be built. Once completed, the line will cut off by 10 percent the distance between the copper mining areas in Zambia and Rhodesia. And this will mean a substantial saving for Zambia.

Red Chinese Ready to Begin Railroad Venture in Africa

By ANDREW BOROWIEC
Africa Correspondent of The Star

NAIROBI, Kenya

Disregarding its previous failures in Africa, Communist China is about to embark on one of the most costly aid projects ever undertaken on the continent.

It involves construction of a nearly 1,000-mile railway from the East African port of Dar es Salaam to landlocked Zambia (formerly known as Northern Rhodesia).

A number of Western construction firms have rejected the project as unviable. The Peking government has pledged — so far on paper — the equivalent of \$300 million for the railway, which would make it the third biggest foreign aid scheme in Africa, after the Aswan Dam in Egypt and the Volta River Dam in Ghana.

If the project succeeds, it would boost enormously Red China's faltering prestige among African nations.

Penetration Seen

It would also bring Chinese penetration into Africa's heart — to the rich Zambian copper belt, not far from the Zambezi River marking the frontier of white-ruled Rhodesia.

Zambian Foreign Minister R. C. Kamanga told a press conference in Washington Oct. 6 that the agreement entails no commitment on either side to build the railroad. He said the Chinese would only survey the route, and then it would be decided who would build it.

But other nations already have turned down the project as uneconomical. Western and African experts also are skeptical about the ability of the Chinese to construct the 978-mile railway link with any measure of success.

China's own railway system is reported in poor condition. One Chinese railway link, built speedily for political reasons, required 40,000 workers to repair defects in the first five months after opening.

Pact Is Signed

Tanzam Railway agreement (the Tanzania-Zambia Railway) was signed during a visit to Peking by Tanzanian Finance Minister Amir Jamal and Zambian Secretary of State for Finance Soko.

On his return to Dar es Salaam, Jamal praised China's "understanding" of the financial difficulties of the two nations involved and scoffed at speculation that the construction would

bring thousands of Chinese to Africa.

Said President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania: "Our political system is strong enough to withstand any foreign ideology."

Survey of the project is to begin early next year and is to last two years. Construction time is expected to last between three and five years.

The whole project, despite China's pledges, has prompted a number of question marks.

Foremost among them is speculation as to what extent China will supply its own labor. In its previous limited construction ventures in Africa, the Chinese invariably have imported even their own manual labor, causing resentment of the African governments involved.

Thousands Expected

Obviously, a project of the magnitude of the Tanzam Railway excludes this. Nevertheless, thousands of Chinese engineers, geologists and construction experts are bound to arrive into East Africa.

The Chinese offer was surprising in the light of China's steadily decreasing aid volume to Africa. In the past 10 years China has not spent \$300 million throughout Africa. Many of the

aid projects promised have remained largely on paper.

The railway promise comes after speculation—which lasted for several years—that the Chinese would build a trans-Saharan highway, linking Algeria and Mali. Premier Chou En-lai's African visit in 1964 heightened the speculation, but nothing has been heard about the project since.

Landlocked Zambia needs a railway link with Dar es Salaam desperately, particularly in view of its efforts to reduce dependence on the Rhodesian and South African railway system. At this stage, 60 percent of Zambian exports still go via Rhodesia.

Oil for Zambia is transported by columns of trucks across a dirt road from Tanzania—an unsatisfactory arrangement.

Yet the railway has been a controversial subject for nearly 20 years. The World Bank condemned the project as unviable, although the British firm of Maxwell Stamp & Partners claimed it could be carried out for the equivalent of \$360 million.

All Zambian overtures to American, West German, British, Japanese and Russian firms received cool receptions.

WASHINGTON STAR
7 October 1967

Zambia, China Rail Pact Held Limited to Survey

By GEORGE SHERMAN
Star Staff Writers

Zambian Foreign Minister R. C. Kamanga says that the recent agreement with Communist China to survey a route for a 1,000-mile rail link between Zambia and Tanzania to the sea entails no commitment on either side for building the railroad.

"If the Chinese decide they can make a go of it, if they bring in a favorable offer," Kamanga told a press conference here yesterday, "then they may be the ones to build it."

"But it also could be the Japanese, or the Americans, or the British."

The foreign minister, who is here briefly after heading the Zambian delegation to the

current session of the United Nations General Assembly, said that both Tanzania and Zambia had made known "for many years" their desire to build this new railroad linking Zambia, landlocked in the heart of Africa, to the sea. The World Bank had studied the proposition and found it "economically unnecessary."

According to other sources, the preliminary estimate of the bank showed the railroad would cost \$325 million. It would run through rugged forest and mountainous terrain. The starting point would be around Ndola, in the Zambian copper belt to the Tanzanian capital and port of Dar-es-Salaam.

Since the white regime of neighboring Rhodesia gained independence of Britain two

years ago, and U.N. sanctions have been imposed on the illegal government of Ian Smith, the need for the rail link has acquired still more urgency. Previously all Zambian oil imports and copper exports had gone across Rhodesian railways. Today, more and more they are transported by air and the partially-paved Great North Road to Dar-es-Salaam.

"We intend to support the new railway economically by opening up and developing the regions through which it will

run," said Kamanga. He did not know how long the survey would take, or when it would begin. Once the Chinese had finished, Zambia and Tanzania would then come up with "concrete proposals" for building it.

"We must have the railroad," he said. "The door is open for those interested in our development schemes." So far he had not approached either American authorities or international banking officials here about financing.

DISGRACEFUL DEALINGS. (Izvestia, Oct. 8, p. 4. Complete text:) In the last few years Peking has reoriented its foreign trade from the socialist countries toward the capitalist countries. This fact is common knowledge and is not concealed either by the present Chinese leaders or by their imperialist partners. "China is willing to trade even with the devil, including the Republic of South Africa," the American magazine Business Week has remarked.

At the same time, not all of China's foreign-trade operations are reported in Peking. But that which people there try to conceal is written about openly in the world press.

As recently as Oct. 1 the British newspaper Sunday Times, writing about violators of the economic sanctions against racist Southern Rhodesia, cited the following instance. In the middle of August, Peking bought from the Smith regime 60,000 tons of chromium ore, i.e., one-fifth of the country's annual output.

Earlier, the newspaper Times of Zambia made a sensational revelation. It reported that since 1960, the year in which Peking declared that it supposedly was breaking all economic and trade relations with the R.S.A., the volume of trade between China and the Republic of South Africa has exceeded 20,000,000 British pounds sterling. The newspaper emphasized that the volume of China's trade with the R.S.A. is greater than its trade with all the other countries of Africa south of the Sahara combined.

The Tanzanian newspaper Ujamaa recently wrote that "Peking, pathologically afraid of the possible loss of its prestige among the independent African countries, tries not to advertise its trade ties with the R.S.A., which bring it considerable benefits." The Japanese press has repeatedly written about the intermediary role of firms in Tokyo and Osaka in China's purchases of rare-earth elements and strategic raw materials from the R.S.A.

The press of the nonaligned countries has already written several times about the U.S. Defense Department's purchases of Chinese goods in Hong Kong for use in the aggressive war in Vietnam. The Ceylonese newspaper Sun recently reported new facts on this score. Citing reliable sources, it wrote that the U.S. Seventh Fleet has purchased from Hong Kong firms secretly controlled by Peking a consignment of various goods and 15 transport barges, which were taken to South Vietnamese ports.

All these facts tear away the veil of noisy revolutionary phraseology from the disgraceful dealings of the Mao Tse-tung group with colonialists and racists. Few people now doubt

the fact that there are two sets of rules in Peking. One—"resolutely fight against imperialism"—is ornamentation for the Maoist facade. The other—"money has no smell"—is for practical deeds. What sanctimonious hypocrisy!—Izvestia Press Service, Oct. 7.

Rhodesia Herald, Salisbury
7 September 1967

CHINA RAIL LINK OFFER TERMS ARE SURPRISE

Lusaka, Wednesday. — THE building of the Tanzania-Zambia railway, to be financed by a loan of about £100m. promised by Communist China, will be preceded by a detailed survey by Chinese experts, it was announced in Lusaka today.

A statement on the agreement with China, issued here today, did not specify the exact extent of the interest-free loan to be given by China for the 1,300 mile rail link which will take Zambia's copper exports straight to the Indian Ocean.

The agreement was signed in Peking earlier this week in the presence of the Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai. Zambia was represented by the Minister of State for Finance, Mr. A. J. Soko, and Tanzania by the Minister of Finance, Mr. A. H. Jamal.

NO DETAILS

The survey provision in the agreement has surprised observers in Lusaka. An Anglo-Canadian survey costing £150,000 was completed some time ago and the Chinese began surveying

the Tanzanian section of the proposed link to Dar es Salaam in 1965, reports Iana.

The Herald Africa News Service reports that the signing of the agreement leaves many questions unanswered, and many observers think it may be Chinese kite-flying.

No details of the agreement are available. It is significant that Zambia's Minister of Finance, Mr. Arthur Wina, suddenly withdrew from the Zambian delegation to Peking.

At a State House Press conference in Lusaka in June on his return from Peking President Kaunda announced that China had agreed to finance and build the line, but that before a final decision was taken replies from Western and Japanese sources who might help would be examined.

RED GUARDS

Meanwhile there have been reports from Hong Kong saying that visiting businessmen have been told in Peking of an appeal for Chinese volunteers to go to Africa to help build the line.

Posters making the appeal ask for Red Guards to go to Tan-

zania, but not to Zambia.

Cynics basing their estimates on previous offers by China to under-developed countries are wondering whether part of the interest-free loan, and the offer to build the railway line, will involve the "wages" of a Chinese labour force flooding East Africa—a prospect which not only Southern Africa, but the West must regard with dismay, particularly if the worker volunteers are Red Guards as the Peking Posters suggested.

EAST AFRICAL REPORTER, Nairobi, Kenya

8 September 1967

THE TANZAM RAILWAY

Can China really afford it?

President Kaunda's recent announcement that Peking has offered £100 million to cover the cost of the proposed 1,000 mile railway from landlocked Zambia to the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam has been received with scepticism in financial circles in Africa.

This offer of aid, a large one by any standards, is unprecedented for China.

In fact, total Chinese aid to Africa has not exceeded £100 million in the ten years 1955-1965, a figure representing 40 per cent of China's overall aid commitment in the developing world.

The Governments of Zambia and Tanzania are understandably keen to build the railway as soon as possible; but unless there are hidden strings to the Chinese offer, China in her present economic plight, can hardly afford to finance the complete project, even though it would greatly heighten Chinese prestige in Africa.

Chinese economic aid offers to the developing world have dwindled markedly in the past two years, and there has always been a large discrepancy between aid offered and what the country has actually received. Mali has only seen about half of the £6 million promised by China since 1960, and only about a quarter of the agreed £6 million for Guinea has been implemented.

The reason for the discrepancy between the first offer and the actual sum produced is the involved way in which the Chinese negotiate and their insistence that the technical personnel whom they provide are paid out of the original credit.

The use of Chinese workers for the labour force, which is certain to be formidable in the railway project, has already proved objectionable to the African Governments concerned.

Experts on the Chinese economy have grave doubts of China's ability to produce the steel required for the project, and are certain that the exacting technical requirements would also present difficulties.

Expertise

The state of China's own internal railway system, as has been reported in the past, with examples of delays, poor workmanship and other shortcomings, is scarcely a recommendation.

When the Chinese Communists wanted the Panki-Chengtu railway built quickly for political motives, the results, as reported by The New China News Agency, were disastrous.

In the first five months after opening, 40,000 workers had to be employed repairing defects, and geological faults could not be eliminated for a long time.

Despite the Chinese offer, local press reports indicate that the Tanzanian Government still favours financial backing by an international consortium rather than by a single country, with funds channelled through the African Development Bank, which is known to prefer investing in regional rather than national projects.

Consortium

The formation of a consortium of Western nations, including the United States, Canada, Britain, West Germany and Japan to back the Tan-Zam project is a distinct possibility.

Negotiations in the development of any such consortium have been recently given impetus by a report recommending that the railway should be built as soon as possible; the report follows up a survey of the scheme sponsored jointly by Britain and Canada at a cost of about £200,000.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development reacted coolly to the last plan for a rail link, but it is reported that the Bank is now inclined to consider the idea more favourably.

The advantages of a consortium offer are recognised both in Lusaka and Dar es Salaam; President Kaunda is believed to be reluctant to accept the Chinese offer, though, together with President Nyerere, he may well be using it as a weapon to draw a safer offer from a Western Consortium.

With these negotiations in the air, and with the formation in mid-July of the Zambian-East African Rail Link Project Planning Company, the rail link now seems to be closer to realisation; the route to the sea from the Zambian copper belt would be shortened by 10 per cent, and Zambia would no longer be dependent on white-dominated Southern Africa.

But it may well be that the real bargaining over aid and contracts is yet to come.

WALL STREET JOURNAL
September 29, 1967

Red Guard Line Chugging Into Africa

By RAY VICKER

LUSAKA, Zambia—"Railroad construction volunteers wanted. For work in Africa."

This is the gist of wall posters beginning to appear in Peking. The railroad would connect landlocked, copper-rich Zambia with the East African Railways network in Tanzania, providing Zambia with an outlet to the sea that would bypass white supremacist Rhodesia. And the wall posters are appealing to the Red Guards, those fanatical youngsters in Red China who have been tearing their nation apart as they seek to follow Mao Tse-tung's ideas about revolution.

The prospect of hundreds and perhaps thousands of Red Guards descending upon an already troubled Africa is a chilling one for the West. But it isn't bothering African nations such as Zambia, which is confident that somehow it will be able to milk as much aid as possible from the Red Chinese without falling into the political traps that might come with the aid.

After trying unsuccessfully to marshal Western aid for a railroad from Zambia to Dar es Salaam on the Indian Ocean in Tanzania, President Kaunda of Zambia turned to Red China. Earlier this month Red China signed a contract to provide \$280 million in aid for the railroad; much of the aid will be in the form of manpower.

Although some Western diplomats see the contract as a political ploy aimed at pressuring the West, evidence is accumulating that the Red Chinese may be serious about this aid. It fits into a broad-scale program for subversion that has been developed by the Red Chinese.

With typical Maoist dialectics, Evergreen, a Red Chinese English-language publication, lists the "three privileged fronts in the front against imperialism" as Vietnam, Venezuela and the Congo. While Zambia is not the Congo, it does rub shoulders with it. And Zambia is currently attuned to Red Chinese offers of aid. The Red Chinese appear about ready to make this a showcase project. If current turmoil in China seems to make an empty gesture of any such offer, it might be well to contemplate that the Chinese expect this project to last perhaps a half-dozen years. If the project drags along, the Red Chinese will hardly be complaining about it, especially if this means that thousands of its propagandists and revolutionists will be solidly entrenched in Africa.

Third on Aid Scale

As now outlined, the railroad would be the third biggest foreign aid project in all Africa. It would be outweighed only by the \$1 billion Aswan high dam, where the Russians provided about a third of the cost in credits, and

by the Volta Dam in Ghana, where Western aid, mainly American, is helping the west African nation create a power and aluminum complex.

Russians have already gained maximum propaganda mileage from their assistance to the United Arab Republic for the Aswan Dam. At first glance one might conclude that the Red Chinese have been losing ground steadily in Africa over the last 18 months. Chinese have been successively expelled from Burundi, Dahomey, the Central African Republic, Upper Volta and Ghana, and relations are strained with Kenya. But Soviet analysts here, elsewhere in Africa and in Western Europe emphasize that the Chinese couldn't care less about diplomatic defeats.

"They are aiming their shots at the common people in Africa," says one west European diplomat here. "Basically, the Chinese feel that most of the governments in Africa are neo-colonialist anyway, and that the future lies in stirring new revolutions among the people."

The Zambian railway thus may be viewed more as an avenue for broadening holds in Africa than as any public relations coup.

Red Chinese already have footholds in the most radical of the African countries, in Guinea, the Congo (Brazzaville), Mali and Tanzania. They are showing Guineans how to grow rice, organizing units akin to the Red Guards in the Congo, teaching in Tanzania and offering military training to any nation that wants it. Meanwhile, of course, thousands of Africans from all sections are being given free trips to China for indoctrination courses and for training in guerrilla warfare.

The Soviet Union is the source for much information about Red Chinese activity in Africa. Recently the Soviets have been warning Africans against machinations of Maoists on the continent. They declared that the Red Chinese have been subverting various revolutionary organizations formed to fight white control in southern Africa.

Radio Moscow specifically listed several groups, which it charged have been taken over by Maoists. It named "The ultra-revolutionary Viriato de Cruz group, expelled for double-dealing from the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola," the "traitorous Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique," the "so-called Pan-Africanist Congress" and the "ephemeral African National Union of South West Africa."

The Moscow station charged: "All these are on Peking's payroll."

The ideological split between Red China and Russia thus has been carried to Africa. Russians back numerous groups that might be called "moderate" in tone, though this description only holds when they are compared with the anarchist groups that Red China backs in Africa. The Red Chinese are taking a

definitely racial approach, seeking to brand Rhodesia as a "Red Chinese line" of the West.

Even the Red Chinese atomic arsenal is being used as an element in a propaganda campaign with strong racial overtones. Red China's atom bomb, for instance, is termed "the colored atomic bomb," implying that it is a weapon on the side of colored races of the world. Red Chinese propagandists preach violence in every form. Except for a few minor aid programs in Africa, the Red program is purely destructive, aimed at smashing the existing order.

Ironically, white liberals in America, Britain and elsewhere sometimes find themselves backing Red Chinese causes as they support African nationalists on the continent. The Red Chinese have latched onto the most violent of the anti-white movements in Africa, with Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia the primary targets. Funds collected in the Western world to assist "African freedom movements" in these countries often help African youths study in Red China.

Incensed Portugal

In Rhodesia and South Africa, numerous people, especially those on the government side, allege that Zambia has become a key route for funneling Chinese-trained guerrillas into southern Africa. Portugal became so incensed at this activity not long ago that it temporarily suspended shipments of Zambian copper over its railroad in Angola as a warning to the Zambian government.

Thus, Red China's offer to build the projected new railroad may be part of a broader subversion plan. Whether or not African na-

tions such as Tanzania and Zambia have the ability to maintain control of the situation is something for the future to show. Chinese already have considerable influence in Tanzania, a country that leans far more toward socialism than toward Western democracy.

The railroad project is certainly high on President Kaunda's priority list. Copper-producing Zambia has found itself pressed more and more by transportation difficulties. It galls African nationalist President Kaunda when he must have anything at all to do with Rhodesia. But Zambia's best current outlet to markets is by way of the Rhodesian railway across Rhodesia and Mozambique to Beira.

The easy way to ship copper since Rhodesia declared its unilateral independence of Great Britain nearly two years ago would have been the old way, across Rhodesia. This might have earned vital foreign exchange for Zambia.

But, under African nationalist pressure, President Kaunda has elected to be the leading anti-Rhodesian nationalist in his part of the world. This role calls for him to be more concerned about what is happening in Rhodesia than about any economic harm his own country might be experiencing. So Zambia has been avidly seeking alternative transportation routes, at what promises to be a high price. The proposed rail link is one of the alternatives. So expensive is this route that the World Bank figures it to be uneconomic.

The rail link could be expensive indeed for Zambia in political terms, too, if the line becomes a route for bringing Red Guards into the country.

WASHINGTON POST
16 November 1967

Proposed Tanzam Railway Becomes an African Issue

East and West Are Involved In Efforts to Finance Line

By Anthony Astrachan
Washington Post Foreign Service

LUSAKA, Zambia, Nov. 14.—The Tanzam Railway appears likely to become as important a benchmark in Africa's political and economic development as the Aswan Dam and the Rhodesian rebellion—whether it succeeds or fails.

It is a proposed 1000-mile rail link from Zambia's copperbelt to the Tanzanian port and capital of Dar es Salaam. It is comparable to Aswan both in size—its nearly \$400-million price tag makes it the third largest foreign aid project in Africa after Aswan and

Ghana's Volta River dam—and political sensitivity. The West so far has declined to back it and Communist China has stepped in with an open-ended offer.

It is Zambia's main economic answer to Rhodesia's seizure of independence as a white-ruled state. If it does not work, it will increase Black Africa's already sour feelings about Rhodesia.

How It Started

Zambia's future leaders started dreaming about the

country achieved independence in 1964, when they realized they would not want to continue dependent on a white-ruled Rhodesia for exporting their copper and importing everything.

They had a first rude awakening when the World Bank turned thumbs down on the idea in 1964 on the grounds that transport through Rhodesia's existing railways was the only economically sensible plan, that no political development was really likely to disrupt it, that the Zambian economy was unlikely to be able to afford a second railway system, and that if routes were needed to the north and east a road system would pay off better.

Alternative Necessary

One of the Bank's basic premises disappeared in 1965 when Rhodesia took independence with no intention of giving black Africans a significant political role, and thus made Zambian dependence on Rhodesia's railways politically unthinkable.

An alternative thus became a life-and-death matter to Zambia, relatively rich by African standards so long as it could export its 700,000 tons a year of copper—the non-Communist world's second largest production. It was also important to Britain, Zambia's biggest cus-

tomers, and the United States base of one of the two big mining companies.

Britain and America pitched in with an emergency airlift and a road improvement and truck program to keep copper coming out and oil coming into Zambia, whose Rhodesian supplies were cut off when sanctions stopped the flow of oil to Rhodesia's refinery from Beira in Mozambique. But they did not become converts to the idea of the Tanzam Railway.

Tanzania became as enthusiastic as Zambia, however, not only because it wanted to help a sister African state but even more because the railway offered the first hope of opening up the agricultural potential of the Kilombero valley and the mineral resources of the Mbeya area, both in southwest Tanzania and both stymied by lack of transport.

The two countries did not become so obsessed with the idea of the railroad that they ignored other means of transport. Improvements to the Great North road are under way, some with American help, but economists and transport experts in Lusaka and Dar es Salaam do not believe the road can handle Zambia's export and import needs by itself.

Pipeline Being Built

A 1060-mile, eight-inch pipeline is under construction to carry oil from Dar to the Zambian copperbelt town of Bwana Mkubwa (a Swahili phrase that means Big Boss and is under attack in East Africa as a colonialist inheritance). It is being built by Italian contractors and will carry oil from the Dar refinery run by Italy's LFC, but the \$42.5 million it costs is basically an investment of the two African nations.

They believe the Tanzam railway is still a necessity, particularly since road and pipeline projects will not by themselves eliminate Zambia's dependence on Rhodesian railways, still carrying about a third of its copper exports and three-quarters of all its imports, and the equally unreliable rail routes through the Congo and Angola, Malawi and Mozambique.

The two countries now have a Western produced survey that says the railway makes economic sense, and Peking's offer to build it.

The survey was financed by Britain and Canada and made by three firms headed by Maxwell Stamp, British economists. It puts the cost of construction and rolling stock at \$353 million, plus \$33 million to enlarge the harbor at Dar es Salaam to handle an estimated 2.5 million tons more of cargo if the railway is completed by the early 1970s. That puts the total cost at \$386 million.

The Stamp report assumes that the railway will make a profit if it carries two million tons or more, a profit estimated at \$51.8 million in 1981 assuming that the Tanzam operational costs will be below those on the older Rhodesian railway system.

Question of Method

The Stamp team assumed the railway would be built by modern methods, while the Chinese are believed to be planning a labor intensive method, which would add three years to construction and affect profit estimates. If the Chinese build the railway the same way they built the Friendship Textile Mill in Tanzania, it will also operate by labor intensive methods in an antiquated style (the textile mill uses 1938 equipment, according to a Zambian source) which may also reduce the profits.

But the Stamp report specifically says the Tanzam link would be profitable even if there were no political objection to using Rhodesia railways, because the Zambian economy has developed so much faster than the World Bank anticipated. The Rhodesian system would have to make a large capital investment to cope with the increase in Zambian traffic, which affects the comparison.

Complete comparisons of rail versus road systems have not been made. But copperbelt experts point out that most of the rail traffic will travel the full 1000 miles. American and European arguments for the superiority of roads assume that traffic will be picked up and let off at many points along the route, not true in this case.

Report Guarded

The Stamp report, though its basic estimates and conclusions have been published unofficially, is carefully guarded by the Zambian government—

to other interested governments. This is part of the webster of political and diplomatic maneuvers that surround the railway and obscure the economic debate on it.

The American Embassy in Lusaka still says it hasn't seen the Stamp report, though American diplomats have been seen with copies of it. United States officials seem to recognize little economic justification for the railway, though underneath they are defensive about the fact that the U.S. Congress is highly unlikely to appropriate anything like the sum needed to build it. Supporters of the railway wish the U.S. would get an international consortium started like the one that arranged finance for the Niger River dam in northern Nigeria. They say the Tanzam link is just the kind of regional project that U.S. aid to Africa is supposed to favor.

Zambia has released no details of the Chinese offer, though an agreement has been signed. One source who has seen the agreement says it goes much further than the \$4-million two-year survey of the route reported as the only commitment by some Washington sources. He says it commits the Chinese to an interest-free loan to build the whole link. Other sources have estimated the Chinese commitment at \$280-million, but it is likely that this is an order of magnitude rather than a precise figure.

An important and unanswered question is how many Chinese will pour into Zambia to conduct the survey and build the railway.

Don't Seem Committed

The Zambians do not seem to be committed to accepting the Chinese offer. They say they have asked for Western indications of interest. Western embassies deny this. Zambia did ask Canada, West Germany, France and Japan, as well as China, for help in 1965. Zambian Vice President Simon Kapwepwe said in an interview that he had asked Secretary of State Dean Rusk for help on the railway when he visited Washington as Foreign Minister last year. But in Western diplomat practice, asking Rusk for help in conversation is not the same as exchanging formal papers with technical specifications.

The Chinese have behaved fairly well in Zambia, where they have been building roads like those in Kenya. But the

propaganda of their dance team that came for the celebration of Zambia's independence anniversary last month and the zeal of some Chinese have raised some Zambian eyebrows. Government officials wear buttons with a silhouette of President Kenneth Kaunda, widely believed to be intended to halt the wearing of Mao buttons distributed by the Chinese.

But the correct Chinese behavior and profitable production at the Dar es Salaam textile mill are what the Zambians hope will be the model for Chinese participation in the Tanzam Railway, if it occurs.

China watchers believe Peking can afford the foreign exchange cost of the railway, though it is larger than all Red Chinese assistance to Black Africa so far. But they wonder if the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution will allow China to spend such resource of money and manpower so far from home.

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January 1968

Evidence of Hanoi's Control and Direction
of the Viet Cong and the NFLSVN

In January 1967 elements of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division overran a strategically vital Viet Cong field headquarters in South Vietnam. This headquarters turned out to be the link between Hanoi and Communist military forces fighting in South Vietnam -- in effect, the command post through which Hanoi's Communist party, the Lao Dong, issued orders to its fighting units south of Vietnam's demilitarized zone. It was learned later from interrogations of captured NVA regulars, who were Lao Dong members, that the parent unit for this headquarters had been set up in 1961 by the Lao Dong in Hanoi. The parent unit, called the Lao Dong Party Military Committee, is a classic example of Party control of the state via the interlocking directorate, for the Military Committee is at the same time a Lao Dong organ and a section within the North Vietnamese military establishment directly under Defense Minister Giap.

The command post in South Vietnam overrun by the 101st Airborne was called the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) and proved to contain a rich lode of Communist documents. These included detailed instructions from the Lao Dong to its branch in South Vietnam called the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP). One of the most significant documents found in this haul, written by the Lao Dong's First Secretary, Le Duan, emphasized the importance and necessity of Lao Dong control at every level of Viet Cong operations. The tone of Duan's letter was one of unquestioned command -- that of a superior to a subordinate element.

Lao Dong control of Communist elements in South Vietnam has been clearly apparent since 1961 when a Lao Dong Central Committee resolution was discovered among documents captured by South Vietnamese Government forces. The document read in part, "it must be clearly understood that ... although the overt name is different (PRP) from what it is in North Vietnam, nevertheless, secretly ... the party segment in South Vietnam is a segment of the Lao Dong Party under the leadership of the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Ho (Chi Minh)" Other documentary evidence has since substantiated and clarified the role of the PRP as a mere cadet branch of the Lao Dong. In early 1962 the Lao Dong, finding the PRP leadership and spirit in the South lacking in verve, circulated a statement among National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) cadres which complained that despite the Lao Dong's "six years of efforts in the South the revolutionary movement continues to lack organization and leadership It is required that the revolution in the South be placed under a unified system. Only by this means can the revolution be accelerated ... the PRP (has been) ... established to assure that the revolution in the South will have proper leadership."

This claim of Party leadership of the Northern forces was readily acknowledged by the NFLSVN in a captured document dated 1962: "The Party is the highest organization. It is responsible for the leadership of all other organizations, the liberation association, the mutual aid associations, as well as the leadership of all the people who will overthrow the old regime for the sake of the new. The Party is the paramount organization."

Between the evidence offered by captured Lao Dong, Viet Cong and NFLSVN documents and the statements made by NVA and Viet Cong prisoners and defectors, the pattern of control emerges clearly: Through the standard Communist mechanism of interlocking membership of ranking Communist leaders in parallel Party and state posts, the Lao Dong controls the North Vietnamese Government. The Lao Dong Party in the North also controls the PRP in the South ("the party segment in South Vietnam is a segment of the Lao Dong Party ... headed by Chairman Ho"). The PRP in turn controls and directs the National Liberation Front and its military arm the Viet Cong ("The Party is the highest organization ... it is responsible for the leadership of all other organizations,...").

Communist control of this command structure is freely acknowledged by the Lao Dong to such subordinate elements as Viet Cong fighting units and PRP members. Typical is the statement of a Viet Cong lieutenant and PRP member who defected to the South Vietnamese Government in May 1966: "The PRP in the South and the Lao Dong Party of the North are one and the same. It's the Communist party. The only difference, I was told, was that a Party member in the North had to observe more rules than his counterpart in the South."

Another document picked up by soldiers of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division when they captured COSVN headquarters in January was the record made of a speech delivered by North Vietnamese General Nguyen Van Vinh concerning North Vietnamese-Viet Cong policy. Vinh's speech, which has been widely circulated in the press, was replete with references to Lao Dong Central Committee resolutions which must be executed, with "our" and "we" references, statements about Northern reinforcements for the forces fighting in the South, and possibly most damning of all, in the context of negotiations, an anticipated "opportunity offered by the negotiations to step up further our military attacks ... (until) ... the Americans would withdraw their troops and we will continue the struggle to achieve total success." General Vinh is head of both the North Vietnamese Government and Lao Dong Party organs concerned with reunification of North and South Vietnam -- again the interlocking arrangement which ensures Party control of the state.

In April 1967 another rich haul of captured documents added to earlier knowledge gained from NVA and Viet Cong defectors regarding specific provinces in South Vietnam where the North Vietnamese Army

has direct responsibility for military activities. These include Kontum, Pleiku and Darlac provinces in Western Central Vietnam as well as a large sector in Southeast Laos. According to captured documents, Quang Doc province, bordering Cambodia, has also been organized under North Vietnam's direct supervision as a base for safeguarding communications between the NFLSVN and Hanoi and possibly as a new location for COSVN (mentioned in above as Hanoi's command post for issuing orders to its fighting units in the South). In addition, the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam are believed to be under direct North Vietnamese military control.

North Vietnamese military control of Communist forces fighting in South Vietnam is carried out by ranking members of the NVA command structure. There are at least eight NVA generals and a number of senior NVA colonels now permanently assigned to command posts in the South.

The frequent combination of these military positions with a corresponding political (Party) role has been regularly reported by NVA and Viet Cong prisoners and defectors. For example, Major General Tran Do, Political Officer in COSVN, is a Lao Dong Central Committee member. Along with Lieutenant General Tran Van Tra, also a Central Committee member, Do is responsible for implementing Lao Dong/PRP control of the Viet Cong.

Both of these men were deputies to General Nguyen Chi Thanh prior to his death in July 1967. Thanh, the senior political officer in the South, was a four-star general in the NVA, second in military rank only to North Vietnam's Defense Minister Giap and commander of all Viet Cong forces in the South. He was buried with highest military honors, his funeral being attended by ranking members of Hanoi's hierarchy, including President Ho Chi Minh.

According to claims made by NVA and Viet Cong prisoners, Thanh's replacement as commander of Viet Cong troops is Major General Hoang Van Thai, well-known as one of the founders of North Vietnam's military and political machinery and a close comrade of Ho Chi Minh and General Giap. Prisoners have also reported hearing rumors that Thanh's replacement may be General Van Tien Dung. Dung is Chief of Staff of the NVA, a ranking member of the Lao Dong and is also an old comrade in arms of President Ho and Defense Minister Giap.

Major General Hoang Van Thi, one of Giap's deputies and a Deputy Chief of Staff for the NVA, is the Commanding Officer (and Political Officer) for Military Region V in South Vietnam. Two other NVA general officers assigned to Military Region V in South Vietnam are Major General Nguyen Don, a Lao Dong Central Committee member, and Major General Le Chuong, who is Chief of Propaganda and Training for the NVA.

It is not necessary to employ speculation, guess work and rumor in trying to piece together the command structure for the forces fighting against the South Vietnamese Government in this war. Documentary evidence, biographic data, photographs, prisoner and defector interrogations, even general knowledge of Communist methods, all lead inevitably to the conclusion that the NFLSVN and the Viet Cong are dominated by the PRP, that the PRP is merely a cadet branch, a subordinate element of the Lao Dong and that the Lao Dong controls the North Vietnamese Army and the Government of North Vietnam. The case has been concisely stated by a senior Viet Cong officer, Colonel Le Xuan Chuyen, who recently defected to the South Vietnamese Government: "the Viet Cong is nothing but an extension of the (North Vietnam) People's Army."

January 1968
(1)

North Vietnamese Intervention in South Vietnam

Information and comment on North Vietnamese troop disposition in South Vietnam from official U.S. and South Vietnamese sources, North Vietnamese news releases, etc:

The number of North Vietnamese military personnel confirmed in the South in 1959-60 were 1,800; in 1964, 4,400. The first complete units began arriving in 1965. (US State Dept., February 1965).

Since May 1966 North Vietnamese regulars have infiltrated both through Laos and through the DMZ, a fact which the North Vietnamese Government has not recently taken pains to deny.

On 12 December 1966, NFLSVN President, Nguyen Huu Tho, in a message to North Vietnamese leaders, acknowledged that the "North Vietnamese people are doing their best to fulfill their task as the major rear area, the cradle of the revolution for the whole country." (VNA, 16 December 1966).

In a tape recording captured early in 1967 and made public by the South Vietnamese Government, a North Vietnamese Army officer told a Lao Dong Party (Central Committee meeting that despite the decrease in Viet Cong guerrilla personnel, total main force strength had nevertheless increased sharply owing to the arrival of more men from North Vietnam. Well-known Viet Cong military units, such as the 271st Main Force Regiment, are now 50% manned by NVA regulars as the demand from the Viet Cong for additional support grows.

North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, in an interview with a reporter from JEUNE AFRIQUE, said of the U.S. demand for reciprocal de-escalation: "We are in our own country and we shall fight as long as the aggressors remain on our soil." (JEUNE AFRIQUE, 16 April 1967).

It was estimated in April 1967 that nearly half the Communist forces in the South were North Vietnamese (US State Dept., 15 May 1967).

On 28 May 1967, the Liberation Armed Forces Command, reporting 1966-67 winter-spring fighting, spoke of "emulating North Vietnam ... our great rear area ... and co-ordinating our activities with it" (VNA, 30 May 1967).

Joseph Alsop

Hanoi's Dilemma: Cut Losses In South or Use Home Army

AMONG the informed leaders and analysts, as already reported in this space, there are two almost diametrically opposed views about the next stage in Vietnam. Both have the same basic assumption: that the North Vietnamese can no longer carry the huge manpower burden of the Southern war on the old system.

The difference is about the way this dilemma will be resolved in Hanoi. If you are heavily over-spending your income, you can either reduce your rate of expenditure, or else you can draw further upon whatever capital you may still have.

The more hopeful view is that the Hanoi leaders will choose the first alternative, reducing their over-ambitious troop structure in the South, and thereby cutting the monthly losses they must replace with new troops. The gloomier view is that the Hanoi leaders will, in effect, draw upon their remaining capital, by using their home army in North Vietnam to provide reinforcements and replacements in South Vietnam.

The first thing to say about this second view is that there's no evidence to support it. Indeed, it runs counter to the more important recent evidence, such as the increasingly peculiar behavior of Prince Norodom Sihanouk concerning the problem of the Cambodian sanctuaries.

THE SECOND thing to say, however, is that those who have tentatively taken this view are men of great experience and sound instinct, notably including Gen. William C. Westmoreland. While in Washington, Westmoreland privately stated that he thought it quite possible that the Hanoi leaders would soon send three to five more regiments of their home army into South Vietnam.

He stressed that this was no more than a possibility. He stressed, too, that there were no new indicators—of increased troop movements, for instance—to turn the possibility into a semi-probability.

He merely remarked that this was something he had to be ready for; and he added that he was completely ready. Indeed, he predicted that the Hanoi leaders would lose rather than gain by the additional human investment in South Vietnam that he was talking about.

Any hunch of General Westmoreland's must be profoundly respected, for no one else has anything approaching comparable experience. It must be added, however, that whichever way they resolve their dilemma, the Hanoi leaders rather plainly share General Westmoreland's expectation that there may be bad trouble ahead for them.

The fact of the matter is that in an extremely deft and secretive way, Hanoi long ago began planting certain obscure seeds. And these seeds, if the war in the South goes badly for Hanoi, can then be watered and brought to bloom as a drive to open the kind of "negotiations" that may be supremely dangerous, yet will appeal to many uninformed people in this country.

Last summer, in brief, Hanoi's southern puppets of the National Liberation Front rather inconspicuously issued a kind of political platform. The great novelty in the platform was a call for "free general elections" which would lead, in turn, to a "national union democratic government," including NLF representatives but not exclusively recruited from the Communists' adherents.

AT THE time, no great stress was laid upon this NLF proposal of coalition. More recently, however, the top Soviet leaders have taken to referring to it fairly pointedly, in one context or another. The Soviets' Eastern European allies have gone even further, finding all sorts of ways to pass the word to American diplomats that the NLF platform was a most important document, to which the United States had given too little weight.

"It has been like the overture of the symphony two years ago," one of the wiser Kremlinologists has said. "The symphony" in question was the wonderfully well-orchestrated, loudly reverberating Soviet-Eastern European drive in the autumn of 1965, to secure a long bombing pause which, so the Soviets intimated, would then lead to fruitful talks.

In the present instance, the wisest Kremlinologists feel that no "symphony" itself will begin without a decisive signal from Hanoi—which was lacking in 1965. Captured documents, explaining what Hanoi really means by coalition government in South Vietnam, meanwhile indicate that the signal may conceivably be given later on, if worst comes to worst.

Coalition, it is stated, will be nothing but a tactic, which will be necessitated, if and when that time comes, by the Vietcong's inability to win "complete victory" without further ado. Under the cloak of coalition, it is further stated, the countryside is to be "occupied"; after that, the towns are to be "surrounded"; and when that moment arrives, "complete victory" will then be within easy grasp. "Complete victory," of course, means the Communist subjugation of the South.

Vacant Post Of VC Chief Seen Filled

SAIGON, Sept. 10 (UPI)—The general who was chief of staff of the army when Vietminh forces defeated the French 13 years ago has been named commander of Vietcong troops in South Vietnam, intelligence reports from prisoners indicated today.

Informed military sources in Saigon identified the North Vietnamese commander as Maj. Gen. Hoang Van Thai, a 61-year-old officer who is well versed in guerrilla warfare and political insurgency.

Thai is a close associate of North Vietnamese Defense Chief Vo Nguyen Giap, the architect of the Vietminh victory over the French. Giap's theories on warfare have become a kind of handbook for Communist insurgency.


Thai, one of the founders of North Vietnam's military and political machinery, has apparently been appointed commander of Vietcong forces in South Vietnam to replace Gen. Nguyen Chi Thanh.

The position is known as the head of the Central Office for South Vietnam. This controls South Vietnamese Communist political and military activities.

Thanh, according to Radio Hanoi, died on July 8 of a heart attack.

Thai's apparent appointment as the new commander came as no surprise to the U.S. Command. He is rated as a "brilliant strategist" who is very popular with his men and is not content to issue commands from a desk. He was reported to have been in South Vietnam prior to his appointment.

During World War II, Thai



Associated Press

HOANG VAN THAI

... new Vietcong chief?

helped build the Vietminh, the predecessor to the Vietcong, and later joined Giap and Ho Chi Minh in establishing the North Vietnamese army.

ASAHI EVENING NEWS, Tokyo

21 November 1967

VC Jungle Camp in Cambodia

By George McArthur and Horst Faas

AP ON THE CAMBODIAN BORDER, Nov. 20—The carefully camouflaged Viet Cong camp was hidden beneath lush jungle about four miles inside neutral Cambodia.

The signs were unmistakable, despite Cambodian denials, that many hundreds of men and tons of supplies had crossed this jungle site and gone on to the war in South Vietnam. It offered hard evidence from the Cambodian side of the frontier that such camps exist.

The camp had sheltered several hundred men, probably from a major headquarters command group. The occupants had left barely days before. Some had been in the area the previous night, as shown by fresh footprints following a heavy rain the day before. One soldier had left behind a khaki mosquito net, still rigged over a hammock.

From the camp and stretching toward the unmarked frontier with Vietnam was a heavily traveled military road, running through virtually uninhabited jungle. Monsoon rains had turned stretches of it into a bog. Engineers had laid down a carpet of neatly trimmed logs. The corduroy surface was capable of supporting heavy trucks, and countless tracks indicated many had passed that way.

The road crossed the border barely nine miles from the South Vietnamese district town of Loc Ninh, scene of a bitter battle this month when the Viet Cong kept up an assault by two regiments, perhaps 5,000 men, for a full week.

American commanders said that battlefield was selected by the Viet Cong because of its nearness to the sanctuary of the order—a sanctuary denied by Cambodia's neutralist ruler Prince Norodom Sihanouk although he has recently qualified his position by saying his 34,000-man army could not possibly seal the 500-mile border.

Cambodian military officers on the frontier indicated little effort had been made. They claimed, however, that there were no permanent Viet Cong camps and no serious incursions.

Prince Sihanouk has been informed. His reaction has not been disclosed.

But Premier Son Sann said an investigation will be made by Cambodian officials.

"It is impossible that the camp was used for any long period of time," the Premier said. "It was not a sanctuary."

He acknowledged that there had been some crossings of the frontier by Communist forces, but he said the Cambodian Government has always demanded withdrawal as soon as the intrusions were discovered.

Reporters visited the frontier at the invitation of the Prince. Diplomats in Phnom Penh felt that despite his stated sympathies with the Viet Cong he did not believe the Communists were seriously using Cambodian territory as a stage area.

The Prince did not qualify his invitation to the frontier. He offered military escorts and ordered provincial officials to cooperate with Western newsmen. They did.

When we drove to the district capital of Mimot, about 15 miles from the Vietnamese frontier, and pointed out precisely where we wanted to go, no difficulties were raised. On a map, we pinpointed a jungled area of the border within a hundred miles of Saigon. The district administrator, Oung Hong Cheng Hor, an affable 39-year-old career civil servant, laughed and said we would find nothing. Then he hospitably laid out a three-hour lunch.

Our preselected site, on the basis of information from qualified sources, was a thin track branching off National Route 7 and barely marked even on detailed maps. From the paved highway which parallels the border north of War Zone C, the track was barely noticeable—the entrance thickly shrouded by trees.

On each side were ordinary signs warning against smoking, forest fires or the unauthorized cutting of timber. Walking down the twisting trail, there was nothing out of the ordinary save the unusual number of tire and cart trucks on a small dirt road that ostensibly led nowhere.

Then, a few hundred yards into the heavy woods, the corduroy road burst into view—a road ly deserted area. To one side was a small camouflaged clearing surrounded by a shallow drainage

ditch.

It was late afternoon and the small military escort was embarrassed. A young lieutenant said perhaps the road was used by timber thieves. Another suggested it was built by the forestry department.

ON THE CAMBODIAN BORDER, Nov. 21—We asked to come back the next day, with a bigger military escort to go deeper into the jungle. The Army major in charge of our escort agreed but the friendliness shown earlier in the day was gone. Prince Sisavath, a cousin of Prince Norodom who was along, remarked somewhat bitterly: "I suppose you will write about the Sihanouk trail."

Next morning, when we started back into the jungle with a larger escort, the Prince was absent but there was a full escort including an Army truck with a 20 mm. cannon which stayed on the paved road to protect us, it was explained, from possible attack by intruding American planes.

Back in the jungle, with troops deployed on all sides, a little path off the corduroy road led within half a mile to the Viet Cong camp site.

There was no mistaking the neat military order, the shelter, the little bamboo desks and tables.

Drained ditches were dug around each shelter. Everything was camouflaged. Some shelters also contained the little bamboo pens used by the Viet Cong to house pigs or chickens. A khaki mosquito net dangled in one palmetto-roofed shelter.

Although the Communist forces always police their camps thoroughly, there were incriminating bits and pieces. In what was evidently a dispensary, a little pasteboard container for Japanese-made hypodermic needles was found. Other medical labels—from Cambodia and South Vietnam—turned up. There was also a little plastic North Vietnamese medical supply bag. A soap container made in Saigon was located.

Beneath some leaves was buried a page from an old notebook—written in Vietnamese and the evident record of the camp's supply department. It was dated Oct. 11, 1967, and listed such items as sugar, vegetables, cloth, tea, pigs, chickens and kerosene.

Another slip of paper in Vietnamese was the receipt for a pig, dated Nov. 3, 1967.

Such evidence as could be found indicated the camp was used by both North and South Vietnamese. The Vietnamese writing contained some peculiarities normally associated with the North. Anyone who has seen similar camps in Vietnam itself could be certain this was a guerrilla camp.

Qualified sources in Cambodia said the Cambodian Army never sets up such camp sites. Neither would the small forestry service. Furthermore, no Cambodian military operations had been conducted in this area and, in fact, Cambodian Regular Army forces do not normally even patrol within five miles of the Vietnamese frontier.

The road, however, was heavily

traveled. The tracks included those of big double-wheeled trucks as well as countless bicycles and oxcarts—both favored means of transportation by the Viet Cong.

The location of the camp indicates that the Viet Cong is regularly using Cambodian Route 7 which runs east from the capital of Phnom Penh and roughly parallels the South Vietnamese border for about 40 miles above War Zone C where much of the fighting in Vietnam has taken place in the past year.

Checkpoints along Route 7 are virtually nonexistent. Any ordinary civilian truck coming down from the North would pass unnoticed.

Parking areas along the corduroy jungle road we located could easily handle 20 trucks without danger of discovery. Loads were evidently taken off the trucks here

and placed on oxcarts or bicycles for onward transport.

There were 20 or more log platforms which could serve to keep rice or other stores off the damp earth. All platforms were constructed in precisely the same manner, 12 inches from the ground and with five log cross-members.

One such Viet Cong camp, of course, does not prove the American contention that the Viet Cong systematically violates the Cambodian frontier and use Cambodian territory as a sanctuary. The American say, however, that such camps are numerous along the northern half of the 500-mile Cambodian-Vietnamese frontier. It takes a week or more on foot to get to areas where such camps might be located. The Cambodian Army has almost no troops there.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
26 April 1967

(5)

Cambodia Appears in Crisis Over Viet Cong Supply Line

BY ROBERT S. ELEGANT

Times Staff Writer

HONG KONG—A gigantic pipeline through Cambodia supplying the Viet Cong with arms, ammunition, food and medicines—operated with the cooperation of senior Cambodian officials—appears to be blowing up into a major political crisis in the Cambodian kingdom.

Overt events of the past few days, combined with painstaking analyses made by Western intelligence specialists, offer a picture of intrigue and smuggling of vast quantities of contraband which would do credit to a high-flown suspense thriller.

But the specialists make a most convincing case of their reconstruction of the manner in which the Viet Cong dissidents in South Vietnam and Cambodian rebel units have been supplied through Cambodia.

Intelligence sources have evidence that small and medium arms for 50,000 troops have entered Cambodia in the past two and a half years and have been knowingly diverted to the Viet Cong.

In addition to those arms, openly landed in Sihanoukville on the Gulf of Siam as Chinese Communist arms aid for the Royal Cambodian Army, they say that ammunition has been smuggled in wholesale in coal shipments from Hanoi and tens of thousands of tons of rice approved

supplied through the overseas Chinese and Vietnamese merchants who control that trade.

Within the past few days, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, prime minister of the kingdom, has arrested five Cambodian officials and closed the country even more tightly than usual to foreign correspondents.

Since one of the men arrested is

Chao Seng, a leftist who virtually controlled the Cambodian economy until late last year, specialists feel that Sihanouk is striving to solve a major internal crisis in an atmosphere of as much seclusion as he can create.

Although information is still too scanty to form the basis for certain judgment, it appears that the brilliant and volatile Sihanouk is himself in political difficulties. Having gone too far down the road with the leftists, both within and without the government, he may now be seeking to recoup his own position.

Power Structure Involved
The massive Viet Cong

supply operation may well be at the heart of Sihanouk's difficulties, since it involves a large part of the Cambodian power structure. Chao Seng, who returned only a month or so ago from semi-exile in Paris which began in November, 1966, appears to be a key figure in the scandal. He was arrested with four others, all of them also former ministers.

A member of the Royal Council, minister for information and education and director of the cabinet, Chao Seng exercised enormous influence for a number of years. Last fall, Sihanouk began the process of cutting him down which has now culminated

in his arrest for involvement with "anti-Khmer rebels."

Cambodia has never denied that the Viet Cong were receiving food and medicine from Cambodian sources. Sihanouk has in recent months declared publicly that he would like reinforcement of the mixed Polish, Indian and Canadian teams of the International Control Commission, whose function it is to investigate allegations that Cambodian neutrality is being violated.

He has admitted that he himself cannot be perfectly sure that the Viet Cong do not take shelter on Cambodian territory nor receive supplies through Cambodia. He has, however, always said that the port of Sihanoukville was open to inspection to prove that no large-scale shipments of Communist arms were entering the country.

It has always been apparent that the Viet Cong could be supplied across the waterways and jungle which cover most of the Vietnam-Cambodia border.

The big question has been: How do the supplies enter Cambodia?

The intelligence specialists are sure they now have the answer to that

question.

Since 1964, according to Sihanouk, the Chinese Communists have agreed to supply the Royal Cambodian Army with arms and equipment of various categories, including aircraft and trucks, sufficient to supply 49,000 men. The Cambodian army numbers no more than this.

As the routes have been reconstructed, there has, in truth, been no covert smuggling. Instead, additional small arms—and a sprinkling of mortars and recoilless rifles—adequate for at least 50,000 men

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have been included in the Chinese arms shipments. With the connivance of senior Cambodian officials, those arms have been diverted to the Viet Cong and to Cambodian rebels who cooperate with them.

Concealed in Cargoes

Ammunition and smaller items have entered Sihanoukville concealed in the cargoes of coal which come from North Vietnam to provide fuel for the thermoelectric plants the Chinese built for Cambodia. It would be almost impossible to sift a shipload of coal for contra-

band—if anyone wished to do so. Once within the country, the ammunition enters the same supply net which handles the arms openly imported.

The final item in the accounting is rice by the tens of thousands of tons. U.S. raiding forces have repeatedly discovered large caches of rice in Viet Cong camps hard against the Cambodian border. Intelligence indicates that those supplies are either imported openly from Cambodia or diverted from internal trade.

It is obvious that an operation of the size intelligence sources believe is involved must inevitably create a whole new apparatus of power, in addition to involving a substantial segment of the conventional power structure.

Specialists believe that Sihanouk may now feel himself directly threatened by the greatly expanded influence the Communists wield in Cambodia within and without the normal state apparatus.

(6)

TIME, NOVEMBER 24, 1967

In nearby Cambodia, three American newsmen—the U.P.I.'s Ray Herndon and the A.P.'s Horst Faas and George McArthur—took Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk up on his offer to prove, if they could, that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were using Cambodia as a sanctuary. Armed with specific map coordinates from U.S. intelligence in Saigon, they uncovered a headquarters complex only nine miles from the South Vietnamese town of Loc Ninh, which the Communists unsuccessfully attacked three weeks ago; the complex included a well-stocked dispensary, officers' quarters, storage facilities and huts for some 500 men. Leading towards the Vietnamese border was a road paved with six-inch-diameter logs for trucks, and truck tracks were everywhere. Back in Phnompenh, Sihanouk promised a full investigation but said that he found it hard to believe that the camp was permanent. U.P.I. man Herndon, however, had foresightedly prowled the camp grounds and came up with some important Viet Cong vouchers. Their dates ranged from as early as February right up to Nov. 1.

(7)

Cambodia Tells Of Aiding Hanoi

New York Daily News Service

SAIGON, Aug. 21—Prince Norodom Sihanouk has said that if the Americans knew the extent to which Cambodia has aided the Communist side in the Vietnam war, they might bomb his country.

Sihanouk made the statement at a rally earlier this month, later broadcast.

"The Reds have been very angry because we have not agreed to engage ourselves too deeply with the proletarian nations," he said. "They ask why we do not agree to go further . . . we have aided the Communists and that is too much. We have aided the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong."

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January 1968

FERMENT AND REPRESSION IN THE UKRAINE

The Ukrainians are the third largest national group under Communist rule -- after the Chinese and the Russians. The Ukrainian Republic is second to the Russian Republic within the USSR, but it is larger in territory and wealth of resources than all other European countries, and only four of them (West Germany, United Kingdom, Italy and France) exceed its population of 45 million. In fact, only seven countries in the rest of this populous world have more people (Nigeria only if it remains intact).

Several million emigres and descendants of emigres from the Ukraine are spread throughout Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere. They are organized, especially in the United States and Canada, in politically influential and relatively well-to-do national associations whose leaders tirelessly strive to develop support outside of the USSR for Ukrainian freedom and independence. Paradoxically, however, the Ukraine, its people, and their problems and aspirations are virtually unknown to and ignored by the non-Ukrainian world.

This paradox is vividly apparent in the multi-column articles in the world press focusing a spotlight of attention on a gallant band of Moscow intellectuals who have been pressing against the hard-liners of the Soviet establishment to achieve greater freedom from regime controls, censorship, and repression -- and on regime countermeasures against them. Who doesn't know about Yevtushenko, the poet-with-a-flair; Tvardovsky, the distinguished editor of the relatively independent NOVY MIR; Solzhenitsyn, the former prisoner whose stark picture of concentration camp life won the approval of the de-Stalinizing Khrushchev and instant fame; the martyred Sinyavsky and Daniel, who sent manuscripts abroad for publication; and the more youthful Ginzburg, Galanskov, and associates who are even now reportedly being tried in secret, after being held incommunicado for almost a year, for similar evasion of controls? This glare of publicity is welcomed by all save the Soviet establishment; it is requested by the dissidents themselves in the belief that it inhibits the regime from taking harsher measures that it would take if the outside world were not watching.

On the other side of the coin, however, the world has been almost oblivious to the voices and actions of a broad representation of Ukrainian intellectuals who have been audaciously expressing complaints and demands which are even more basic and far-reaching than those of their counterparts in Moscow. Their actions are intensified by a strong nationalist resentment against the repressive policies issuing from the Russian center, Moscow.

Many factors explain this paradox, all keyed to the submergence of the Ukrainian people under Russian domination, both in the pre-Soviet Russian Empire and in the structure Stalin built to control the USSR.

Most important has been the language barrier. Russian has become a world language, understood and readily translated in most areas of the world (and, importantly, by the correspondents in Moscow). Although there are about 1/3 as many Ukrainians as Russians, their language has never been widely used or known outside of their homeland -- and even there Russian has been the language used by a large part of the urban population, even in Tsarist times. Soviet policy toward the use of Ukrainian and other non-Russian languages of minority groups has vacillated, but during most of the past 50 years Ukrainian has been officially slighted or repressed in favor of Russian.

Another factor in the paradox has certainly been the barrier erected around the Ukraine by the Soviet regime, a sort of inner curtain within the Iron Curtain which Stalin built around the entire USSR. In other words, the Ukrainians have had even less contact with the outside world than the Russians because the Soviet Government in the past made it more difficult for foreigners to visit the Ukraine than the major Russian centers -- and no one knows how much more difficult for Ukrainian nationals to travel abroad.

* * *

The strength of a national independence movement within the Ukraine is, of course, impossible to measure under present conditions. "While there is a tradition of separate political development in the Ukraine, modern nationalism -- the doctrine that persons of a distinct culture should constitute an independent state -- came late to the area." ¹ Such nationalism developed perceptibly during the last part of the 19th century and the early years of the 20th to the point that several successive Ukrainian "governments" declared and attempted to maintain national independence during the chaotic struggles on Ukrainian territory in the aftermath of the October Revolution. One of these, under the domination of Simon Petliura, lasted almost two years before it fled to Poland as the Red Army completed its conquest of the area. Nationalism was given new impetus with the Soviet grab of the "Western Ukraine" in 1939 and the subsequent activities of Ukrainian groups under German occupation during WWII, though "it was unable to penetrate the mass of the population to any great extent."²

It could be assumed that the growth and successes of national independence movements around the world since World War II, and the rapidly increasing opportunities for Ukrainians in the homeland to learn about such developments in the outside world through foreign radio broadcasts

¹Armstrong, p.3 (See References)

²Ibid., p. 288

and other means of communication, have tended to foster further development of nationalism inside. But until recently there has been little direct evidence to support any such assumption. Official Soviet output plays down any such suggestion, of course; nevertheless, it clearly "doth protest too much" in extolling the love of the Ukrainians for their Russian brothers and their dedication to "proletarian internationalism." Similarly, their condemnation of "imperialist efforts to exploit bourgeois-nationalist survivals" reveals a deep concern with the problem.

The Khrushchev-directed "Third Program" of the CPSU, adopted by the 22nd Congress in 1961 and still in effect, revealed considerable concern with the internal nationalities problem. It pledged the Party to work for the further "drawing together" of the various nationalities in the near future and their eventual "merging".

* * *

Little evidence of rising intellectual ferment in the Ukraine reached the outside world until recent years, but since 1964 numerous materials have been smuggled out, apparently in desperate reaction to a wave of arrests in 1965 and early 1966 of several dozen writers, scientists, and students in Kiev and several other cities, and their subsequent secret sentencing to "corrective labor" camps in the Mordvinian ASSR. Reportedly these repressions were carried out in the Stalinist manner after an orgy of searches and interrogations, the victims held incommunicado and relatives and friends unable to learn the charges against them. Numerous appeals and protests against these violations of constitutional rights were openly addressed to the proper authorities by many prominent Ukrainians; the only response was the arrest of some of the protesters.

Beyond the quest for greater freedom of expression and for justice, which also motivates their Russian counterparts, these victims were clearly moved by a strong sense of national Ukrainian patriotism and a conviction that the Moscow regime is discriminating against the Ukraine. When the Ukrainians are openly critical, they are careful not to step outside the role of good Communists and loyal Soviet citizens who are protesting violations of the Leninist nationalities policy and of the Soviet Constitution.³ But to no avail.... Now, like their Russian counterparts, they are seeking to publicize the situation in the outside world in the hope of inhibiting the severity of police repression.

One of the manuscripts smuggled out has just appeared in book form (paperback, in Ukrainian); it was published by the "First Ukrainian

³See discussion of "Leninist nationalities policy" in Appendix.

Publishing House in France," Paris 1967.⁴ Entitled LIKHO Z ROZUMU, which can be freely translated MISFORTUNE FROM ENLIGHTENMENT, and subtitled "Portrait of Twenty Evil-doers," it is a collection of materials on and by twenty victims of the 1965 repressions, several of them women, one in her fifties. Included are photos, biographical sketches, bibliography with excerpts, and some excerpts from letters written in the concentration camps. The "Collector of the Materials" is Vyacheslav Chornovol, an outstanding journalist, former Communist youth leader, and a fellow of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences who was himself arrested in August 1967, tried in Lvov on 15 November and sentenced to 3 years -- subsequently reduced to 18 months, according to reports.

Of particular interest among the contents is a petition dated 27 September 1965 from Odessa poet-philologist Svyatoslav Karavansky to Polish Party First Secretary Gomulka. Karavansky recommends the calling of an international conference of the Communist parties of the world to "define the principles of a Marxist-Leninist nationalities policy" which "should be adhered to" by all parties. In a footnote, Karavansky notes that the Polish Consul in Kiev accepted a copy of the petition and promised to pass it along to his government, the Czech Consul refused to accept a similar petition addressed to Novotny, and both refused to pass it to other Communist states. Karavansky was reportedly picked up on the street in Odessa in November 1965 and sent directly to a Mordvinian camp without even a hearing. An English translation of Karavansky's petition is attached, not only because it so vividly reveals the frustrations of these Ukrainian men of letters under Soviet restrictions, but also because of its reference to the Canadian Communist Kolasky (or Kolyaska), whose book is described below.⁵

⁴Only one of the smuggled manuscripts had been published in book form prior to this: BEREH CHEKAN (The Shore of Expectations), an annotated selection of the works of Vasyl Symonenko, a Ukrainian poet who died in 1963 at the age of 28, by Prolog, Inc., New York, 1966. A 1964 Soviet posthumous collection of Symonenko's works, under the title ZEMNE TYAZHINA (Gravitation of the Earth), had been publicly criticized by Ukrainians inside (including Dzyuba, see below) as well as in the emigration for omitting and distorting some of his best (and most nationalistic) pieces. The Prolog collection includes these works.

⁵Informal translations of some of the other materials in this volume are available on request for those with special interest in the subject. Two are of particular note; one another petition by Karavansky to the Chairman of the USSR Soviet of Nationalities, one of the two houses of the Supreme Soviet, protesting discrimination and repression against the Jews, Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, the Balts and the Caucasians, as well as Ukrainians. The other is the condensed text of the closing statement by lawyer Mikhaylo Horyn in his own defense at a secret trial in Lvov, April 16, 1966.

Another major document smuggled out of the Ukraine is scheduled for publication in an English translation in London (George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd.) and in a French translation in Quebec (Les Editions Parti Pris) early in 1968. The document is a lengthy letter addressed to Ukrainian Party First Secretary (also member of CPSU Politburo) P. Yu. Shelest and Ukrainian Premier (i.e. Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers) V.V. Shcherbitsky late in 1965 by Ivan Dzyuba, a prominent writer and literary critic. Dzyuba was among those arrested earlier in 1965 but was released after interrogation, possibly because he suffers from advanced tuberculosis. In the introductory section of the letter Dzyuba appealed in a moderate, reasonable tone for justice under the law for those arrested earlier that year. He pointed out there are real grounds for concern over "persecution of national cultural life," and concluded the introduction in this vein:

"Personally, I am firmly convinced that today a Ukrainian who is devoted to the cause of building Communism has good reason to be worried about the fate of his nation, and, if that is so, nobody in the world has the power to prevent him from speaking out about it.

"I am firmly convinced that the anxiety felt by a widening circle of Ukrainian youth is the inevitable result of grave violations of Leninist nationality policy, more precisely, a total revision of the Leninist policy of the Party, carried out by Stalin in the 1930's and continued by Khrushchev in the past ten years.

"I am firmly convinced that for the cause of building Communism, for a future Communist society, and for the fate of world Communism, it is difficult to find today anything more useful and more indispensable than the restoration of Leninist policy, since the fate of entire nations lies in the balance."

This introduction is followed by a long, passionately eloquent exposition of the case of a Ukrainian nationalist in protest against the treatment accorded his motherland by the Soviet regime, against Russian chauvinism, and Russification.

Pending the appearance of this book (publication has reportedly been delayed some months due to unexplained factors, and the publishing titles are not even known at this point), an informal translation of the introductory section into English is attached hereto.

A new book on the Ukrainian problem has been announced for publication in January 1968 by Peter Martin Books, of Toronto, Canada. Entitled EDUCATION IN THE SOVIET UKRAINE, A STUDY IN DISCRIMINATION AND RUSSIFICATION, it is described in the publisher's flyer as "a close and damning analysis of Russian cultural and ethnic imperialism within the Soviet

Union." The book is awaited with particular curiosity because of the background of its author, Canadian professor John Kolasky (who is referred to by Karavansky in the attached petition). The publisher describes the author as born in Canada of Ukrainian parents and says he "became a Marxist and a fervent supporter of the Soviet system" as a result of the Depression. "In 1963 he left Canada to study in Kiev," and this book "arises from his two years" there. The flyer quotes as follows from the author's preface:

"Not only is the present policy of the Russian rulers at variance with what was advocated and practiced in the early years after the achievement of Soviet power, but it is a complete violation of every principle on the national question propounded by Lenin, every resolution and decree of the party and the government of this period, and even the Constitution of the USSR, of which article 121 guarantees instruction in the schools in the native language."

It thus would appear that the nationalist ferment which he encountered during his two years in the Ukraine was powerful enough to turn even this Canadian-born Communist of 30 years standing, as Karavansky describes him, into a passionate critic of the Soviet regime.

The Fifth Congress of the Ukrainian Writers' Union was held in November 1966. Its unusually nationalist, "anti-Russification" tone was evident in the speech of Shelest as well as in that of Union Chairman Gonchar and was even reflected in the guest speech of RSFSR Writers' Union Secretary Baruzdin. This tone was seen by many Ukrainians as at least partly the effect of the Dzyuba memorandum, which was widely circulated among the intelligentsia. However, further repression and arrests carried out in 1967 demonstrate that there has been no real improvement. To the contrary, many Ukrainians view the May 1967 shift of Soviet secret police chief V. Ye. Semichastny to the post of Deputy Premier of the Ukraine as a move to harden the Ukrainian government's treatment of what they may see as a potential insurrectionary movement.

Appendix

"Leninist Nationalities Policy"

It is notable that the Ukrainians, and other national minority groups as well, frequently refer to the "Leninist nationalities policy." The reason for this is twofold: Lenin expounded a liberal policy toward national minorities; and evocation of Lenin's views as authority is unchallengeable in the Soviet Union. The record shows Lenin was always highly sensitive to the problems of the minorities; it is also clear that he was always acting with an eye toward the other peoples whom he dreamed of incorporating into the Soviet Union eventually, especially "the hundreds of millions of peoples of Asia who are ready to make their appearance on the historical stage in the very near future." Writing in

Swiss exile as far back as 1914, in "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination," he stated: "Complete equality of rights for all nations; the right of nations to self-determination; the amalgamation of the workers of all nations -- this is the national program that Marxism, the experience of the whole world, and the experience of Russia, teaches the workers...." In a December 1922 letter to the Congress of Soviets, he sharply condemned "the aggression of that truly Russian man, the Great-Russian chauvinist, in reality a scoundrel and man of violence, which the typical Russian beurocrat reveals himself to be." He also criticized Stalin and (Polish-born) Cheka chief Dzerzhinsky -- "the Russified non-Russian always overdoes things in the truly Russian direction" -- for the "Great-Russian nationalist campaign" against the minorities in those early years. The Constitution of the USSR, drafted while Lenin was still at the head of the Party and ratified in January 1924, contained a statement of "guarantee that this Union is a free federation of peoples equal in rights, that the right freely to withdraw from the Union is assured to each Republic...." Despite the hollow mockery that Stalin's policies had made of national rights by 1936, the new Constitution which he proclaimed that year retains these propagandistically useful guarantees. These documents may be most readily found in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF COMMUNISM, by Robert V. Daniels (New York: Random House, 1960). For a fuller analysis of the subject, see THE FORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION, by Richard Pipes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954) or his article "'Solving' the Nationality Problem" in the special issue of PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM described under References, below.

REFERENCES (listed chronologically):

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM, 1939-1945, by John A. Armstrong. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. This is a classic backgrounder; its 23-page Chapter I, "The Emergence of Nationalism," gives an excellent "pre-history" up to 1939, when the detailed account begins.

SOVIET POLITICS AND THE UKRAINE, 1917-1957, by Robert S. Sullivant. New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1962. Covers broader ground and from a different approach, as indicated by the title.

THE SECOND SOVIET REPUBLIC: The Ukraine after World War II, by Yaroslav Bilinsky. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964. An encyclopedic, copiously annotated study of postwar Ukrainian nationalism and Soviet nationality policy in the Ukraine.

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January 1968

Introductory section of letter
from Ivan DZYUBA, undated but
sent in late 1965. (Translated
from Ukrainian.)

To: Comrade P.Yu. Shelest, First Secretary
of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Ukraine and Member of the
Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU

and

Comrade V.V. Shcherbyts'kyi, Chairman
of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR
and Candidate Member of the Presidium of the
Central Committee of the CPSU

Honorable Comrades,

This letter, which I am addressing to you, concerns a matter that has alarmed a large section of the Ukrainian public. I am referring to the political arrests, carried out in a number of Ukrainian cities -- Kiev, Lvov, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Lutsk -- toward the end of August and the beginning of September, mainly among young people, as well as the house-searches and interrogations being carried out at present in Kiev. (I have no information about other cities).

It has become known that questions regarding this matter have been directed to the Central Committee of the CPU by the deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mykhaylo Stelmakh, and by the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, Shevchenko, Prize laureates Andriy Malyshko and Hryhoriy Mayboroda. They received no answer. Finally a group of intellectuals from Kiev have recently turned to the Central Committee of the CPU soliciting an explanation about the nature of the arrests and the fate of the detainees. Among them were chief aircraft designer Oleh Antonov, film director Sergey Paradzhanov, the composers Vitaliy Koreyko and Platon Mayboroda, as well as the writers Leonid Serpilin, Lina Kostenko and Ivan Drach. To our knowledge, they are still waiting for an answer. Meanwhile, we hear reports of continuing house searches, of new people being summoned for interrogation by the KGB, and occasionally of further arrests.

All this intensifies an understandable alarm and occasionally give rise to panicky rumors. In any case, a profoundly abnormal and disgraceful situation has arisen, affronting elementary civic feelings and causing very natural misgivings, as to whether this is compatible with norms of socialist legality, and whether this legality is possible under such circumstances. After all, several dozen people have been under arrest for nearly four months. These people are not traffickers, embezzlers, or hooligans. Each is a competent, eminent, and respected man in his own field (let us mention the well-known men of letters Ivan Svitlychny, Bohdan Horyn and Mykhaylo Kosiv, the talented painter

Panas Zalyvakha, Mykhaylo Horyn, one of the best specialists of industrial psychology in Ukraine, whose innovative projects were commented on quite recently by Izvestiya Mykola Hryn, one of the leading specialists at the Geographic Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, the geophysicist Ivan Rusyn, the student Yaroslav Hevrych, Oleksandr Martynenko and others). These are the people who are being "isolated." No relevant information is supplied in this matter, no reasons for their arrest are given, and no formal accusation is brought forward. To date, a majority of the detainees have not even been permitted to see members of their family. This is in itself inhumane and undemocratic. Furthermore, it creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and alarm. In this atmosphere the most disparate and absurd rumors and conjectures are spreading. The very possibility of such conjectures and hearsay which are caused by the manner of handling the "case," compromises that socialist legality, which we supposedly have restored. Even more ominous is the circumstances that before and after the arrests, statements, dictated by malice, could be heard from certain official quarters, about a nationalist underground supposedly existing in the Ukraine and about other preposterous horrors, invented by someone for some reason.... In such an atmosphere, and under such circumstances when there is a desire to prove an invented tale beforehand, can justice be done to the men under arrest? It is not by chance, after all, that some time ago certain official and unofficial persons, taking advantage of the authority invested in them, spoke with a serious and even doleful countenance about the ostensible discovery of a "center," about the detection of arms, a clandestine press and the like. Since then a month has passed and no longer does anybody dare to repeat these tragicomical fabrications.

Once launched, the irresponsible rumor spreads among the Philistines, takes on even more absurd proportions, gives rise to totally unjustified sentiments, and prepares the ground for the acceptance of a most frightful injustice. Imagination, aroused by indirect insinuation, takes the place of unavailable factual information. "I heard it from the people who don't lie." This is the very same atmosphere that made the crimes of the cultist period possible. Do we have any guarantee that after a month or two a ridiculous new version will not be circulated, a version, which in spite of all its primitivism, might prove costly for the arrested? One can quite obviously feel the desire to "put them away" and to "teach them a lesson." (It is not by chance that the investigation has lasted four months in total secrecy; if there were facts, they would be clarified within a week.) There is obviously malice in the air against a certain category of people (the "nationalists"), and malice, as V.I. Lenin said, is a bad counselor in politics.

This is the very same psychological complex which incited the terrorists of the Stalinist era to their crimes. I recall the words spoken to one of them by Stepan Chauzov, the hero of S. Zalygin's novel Na Irtyshe [On the Irtys River]: "Why do you look for an enemy in a

peasant like me?" And "since you found nothing you come with a grudge." This "since you found nothing you come with grudge" is one of the most terrible and typical traits of despotism and of its psychology. The less proofs, the more malignancy, for you must blind yourself with a bestial hatred against the victim, in order to prevent injustice from tormenting your conscience and to make this appear to be prowess.

The only guarantee of justice has always been and still remains publicity and open knowledge, an opportunity for the public and the individual citizen to know and to control the actions of any officials and authorities, particularly penal authorities. "The masses," Lenin said, "must have the right to know and to verify each, even the smallest step, of their activities". However, in a situation of secrecy and non-existent control (by the broad public) mistakes, abuses, and crimes are bound to appear.

This is why a growing number of people are alarmed and desire precisely publicity in this matter, as the only legal guarantee of justice. Let the competent agency inform the public just who have been arrested and why, or what the arrested men are charged with. If this agency believes that proof of guilt existed or has been gleaned against anyone of the arrested, let these proofs become the object of an open judicial inquiry, let both accusers and accused take the floor, and the people will judge for themselves who is right and who is wrong. After all, this is not simply a kindhearted wish of some overly sensitive people, this is what ought to be according to Soviet laws and the elementary principles of justice and common sense.

However, there is yet another no less important aspect to the discussion of this matter. Although no official or public explanations of the arrests have been offered, there is a constant, quite purposeful aggregation of rumors that "nationalists" have been arrested. In newspapers, lectures, and at meetings the word "nationalism" has again run riot as in the years 1947-49. The obviously absurd tales about underground, arms, press etc. have been supplanted by a new version about "nationalist propaganda." What next? (Apparently the investigating agency is not quite sure itself which paragraphs of the criminal code it will use, what "legal" shape its malice and prejudice against the detainees will take.)

From remote and recent history it is known that in the Ukraine it was permitted to pin the term "nationalist" on anyone who possessed an elementary sense of national dignity, who was concerned with the fate of Ukrainian culture and language, and often simply anyone who in some way failed to please some Russian chauvinist, some "Great Russian Derzhymorda." (V.I. Lenin). [slang for policemen]

It is no secret that during recent years a growing number of people in the Ukraine, especially among the younger generation (not only students, scientists, and creative artists, but by now quite often workers),

are coming to the conclusion that there is something amiss with the nationality policy in the Ukraine, that the national and political position of the Ukraine does not correspond to its formal and constitutional position as a state, that is to say as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic within a Union with other socialist republics, and that the state of Ukrainian culture and language is cause for great alarm etc. -- all this as a result of perpetual, flagrant violations of Marxism-Leninism in the national question, as a result of the abandonment of scientific principles in communist national construction. This constantly growing circle of people had expressed their alarm openly, publicly, and on principle, taking up a perfectly Soviet socialist position, worrying about the plenitude and health of the spiritual and cultural life of our socialist and future communist society, denouncing merely unnecessary and costly losses and deviations on the path forward. Those who believed that these people were mistaken in something, ought to have answered them in the same open and principled way in which they had acted. Instead, the answer was terror, first moral, now physical. Over the last two or three years we have been able to count several dozen instances of repressions on these grounds. Dozens of people were punished by dismissal from their jobs, exclusion from higher educational institutions, disciplinary action by the Party or the Communist Youth League, for participating or being involved in some affair or other, which was arbitrarily and malevolently qualified as "nationalism." Here are some recent examples: expulsion from university (and from the Communist Youth League) of the fifth year student and young poet M. Kholodny for his speech during a discussion of A. Ishchuk's novel Verbivchany [The Villagers of Verbivka], an expulsion contradicting the decision of the Youth League meeting, which did not deem it necessary or possible to expel M. Kholodny; expulsion from the Party and dismissal from her job in the newspaper Druh chytacha [Reader's Friend] of Rita Dovhan, who it is imputed had organized a poetry reading in the Scientific Research Institute of Communications on the 8th of December of this year. In general it must be said that hardly a single poetry reading in the last two or three years escaped such or similar "results," and that the majority of readings, though agreed upon, were simply forbidden ("cancelled") under various pretexts. This borders on the farcical! (Is it worth pondering a bit over this masterpiece of bureaucratic order, this ultimate word of the theory "Art belongs to the People!")

If we were to collect all the facts of this kind, we would get a picture of indefatigable, pitiless, and absurd persecution of national cultural life, that would frighten the very stage managers of this campaign, and would force a great many people to do some thinking. But who knows about this in our present conditions of unobstructed public knowledge?

It is not possible to speak here about all these facts, their description would take up too much space. I shall name only the "highlights," so to say, of a collective nature: the dissolution of the Club

of Young Creative Artists; the story of the Lesya Ukrainka memorial evening in the Central Park of Culture and Rest, July 31, 1963; the destruction of the Shevchenko stained-glass panel in Kiev University in March of 1964 with the subsequent hounding of the young artists who had created it; the prohibition of a meeting at the Shevchenko monument in Kiev on May 22, 1964 and 1965; the subsequent punishment of those who did come to the monument; the prohibition of a Shevchenko memorial evening in the Automatic Machine Tool Factory in March of 1965, with the result that the evening took place in the neighboring park and again with subsequent sanctions against the participants (as a result of staying out in the cold in clothes intended for inside use, and not least as a result of mental shock, the young technologist and organizer of the evening, Oleksandr Mykolaychuk, died two days later); the punishment of several dozen young journalists, graduates of Kiev State University, who had signed a declaration protesting against the groundless dismissal for "nationalism" of the popular university lecturer, Instructor M. Shestopal between winter and spring of 1965; finally, the dispersal (in the literal sense of the word) by the KGB of a group-discussion on the state of Ukrainian culture, organized by university students with the participation of several hundred young people on April 2, 1965, and similar cases. Already then the first arrests, admittedly short-term, were carried out, while at the same time men in plain clothes kept whispering stories about "American dollars," which mysteriously instigated these "assemblages." (Indeed, it is difficult for a bureaucrat who has gone wild from irresponsibility to hit upon something more intelligent! He knows how to do one thing: sell himself for money, and this is why he is incapable of finding any other motivation). The present arrests and the present tales about arms, a press, and again those inevitable dollars, are the logical culmination of that policy of forcibly repressing the interests of youth in national culture. Whether the organizers of the repressions want it or not, they take the shape of terror. But terror, whether moral, psychological, or physical, offers no positive solution to any problem, but only creates new one. "Terror," Engels wrote, "consists for the most part of futile cruelties, committed for their own relief by men who are themselves afraid."

Whoever earnestly desires to solve a certain problem, which has arisen in life, ought to give some thought to its causes and sources. One can arrest not only several dozen, but several hundred or several thousand citizens: all the same, day by day, more and more people in different ways, there and everywhere, will in one way or another express their dissatisfaction and disagreement with many aspects of the present nationality policy. They will feel anxiety about the fate of Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian nation, and will ponder ways and means of redress.

These are honest people with good intentions. They number in the thousands. They are Soviet people. Who can give anybody the right to sever them from the living body of the nation, to suppress their civic

activities, to place them under suspicion? Would he who took such a path not commit another horrible crime against communism and society?

Is he who really thinks about the interests of communism, he who really is motivated by the interests of society, not duty-bound to repress his personal emotions and irritation, to take a more penetrating approach, not to suppress and sever, but to seek out the primary causes and to correct the phenomena of life themselves, the political mistakes and enormities themselves, which produce undesirable results and give rise to undesirable public sentiments.

Personally I am firmly convinced that today a Ukrainian who is devoted to the cause of building communism has good reason to be worried about the fate of his nation, and if that is so, nobody in the world has the power to prevent him from speaking out about it.

I am firmly convinced that the anxiety, felt by a widening circle of Ukrainian youth, is the inevitable result of grave violations of Leninist nationality policy, more precisely a total revision of the Leninist nationality policy of the Party, carried out by Stalin in the 1930's and continued by Khrushchev in the last ten years.

I am firmly convinced that for the cause of building communism, for a future communist society, and for the fate of world communism, it is difficult to find today anything more useful and more indispensable than the restoration of Leninist policy, since the fate of entire nations lies in the balance.

This is what I want to speak of in greater detail.

For this purpose I am including material prepared by me on this topic ("Internationalism or Russification?").....

To the First Secretary of the Central Committee, Polish United Workers' Party, Comrade V. Gomulka

From a citizen of the USSR, Svyatoslav Yosypovych Karavansky, who lives in Odessa. Chornomorsky Shlyakk. 27 Sept '65 (translated from Ukrainian.)

PETITION

The 20th Congress of the CPSU was a turning point in the history of the communist movement. It condemned the policy of unjustified and unfounded repressions which took place in the USSR during the era of the personality cult against a large number of party and non-party members, many of them from among the Ukrainian intelligentsia. In the hands of unscrupulous opportunists unjustified charges of "nationalism", "treason against the Fatherland", etc., made against the Ukrainian intelligentsia, became the means which allowed distortion of Lenin's nationalities policy.

Such notable Leninists as S.V. Kosior, V. Ya. Chubar, M. Skrypnyk, D. Zatonsky, P.P. Postyshev and thousands of other party activists, who had joined the party prior to October or during the Revolution when the party was still under the leadership of V.I. Lenin, were eliminated from the party ranks by unjustified repressions. This crime against the Party went hand in hand with the crime against the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Thousands of writers, artists, pedagogues and scholars were charged with "nationalism" and physically eliminated. It is enough to mention the names of men like director L. Kurbas', writers I. Mykytenko, M. Zerov, D. Zahula, M. Irchan, O. Vlyz'ko, D. Falkivsky, M. Kulish, I. Dniprovsky, O. Sokolovsky, who were shot without reason and who are now rehabilitated, or men like Ostap Vyshnya, B. Antonenko-Davydovych, V. Hzhitsky, Z. Tulub, who were unjustifiably repressed, in order to realize, from this far from complete list of well-known names, the great loss suffered by Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the era of the personality cult, just on the eve of the Great War for the Fatherland. Literally tens of thousands of rank-and-file Ukrainian intellectuals were destroyed. Without doubt, these unjustifiable massacres could not help but be reflected in the fact that during the Great War for the Fatherland there was a certain activation of nationalistic organizations on the territory of the UkrSSR.

After 1945 several attempts were made to renew the unwarranted repressions against the Ukrainian intelligentsia. At the same time, there were repressions against the Jewish intelligentsia.

The 20th Congress condemned unjustified repression against people of various nationalities. Unfortunately, however, in the past few months new attempts have been made to renew groundless repressions against members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the UkrSSR.

In February of this year, I petitioned the office of the Procurator General of the UkrSSR to call to account the Minister of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, Yu. M. Dadenkov. The procurator's

office did not reply to this petition. However, in a private conversation with the procurator, I learned that my petition had been passed on to the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education. After studying the petition, Minister Dadenkov took a number of measures directed at removing the discriminatory regulations governing admissions into institutions of higher learning and special secondary schools of the republic. As it helped to point out shortcomings, my petition, obviously, was well founded and should have been considered beneficial to the cause of Communism. Unfortunately, for certain unknown reasons, various unjustified repressive measures were taken against me.

On September 4 of this year, five members of the Odessa Oblast KGB searched my home. The search revealed no compromising materials. As I later explained, in answer to the questions asked me during the investigation, the KGB found a copy of my petition concerning Minister Dadenkov to the Procurator General of the UkrSSR, dated February 22, 1965, in the possession of the Canadian citizen, Ivan Vasylyovych Kolyaska. This constituted the grounds for the search.

I succeeded in establishing that Ivan Vasylyovych Kolyaska is a Canadian Communist of 30-years standing. Between 1964-65 he studied in the Higher Party School affiliated with the CC CPU in Kiev. Then, in 1965 he supposedly left for Canada. If this is the case, I wonder why the discovery of my petition in the hands of a Canadian Communist caused such anxiety in the organs of state security? It seems to me that what should be of greater concern to Soviet state security organs is that such obvious violations of Lenin's nationalities policy as anti-Semitism, Ukrainophobia, discrimination against nationalities, and other manifestations of bourgeois ideology be eliminated as quickly as possible from our life and that those guilty of violating the Soviet constitution be made criminally responsible. Is it possible that a Canadian Communist who is fighting against world imperialism shoulder to shoulder with us may not know the facts about the violations of Lenin's nationalities policy which have already taken place and still continue in the Ukraine as well as in other Soviet republics? These violations were made possible by the absolutely erroneous nationalities in the branch of education.

Kolyaska has been a Communist for 30 years. If under the influence of reality after one year in Kiev he developed doubts regarding the rightness of carrying out a policy of Russification in the Ukraine, in Ukrainian life, a policy of discrimination against the Ukrainian language and culture, a policy of deporting Ukrainians from the Ukraine and settling Ukrainian cities with non-Ukrainians, usually Russians, then this fact should force the leaders of the CPSU to reconsider whether or not they are applying a correct nationalities policy in the Ukraine, whether it is a Leninist policy, and whether it serves to strengthen the international Communist movement.

Unfortunately, the facts prove that a completely different point of view has taken precedence in the CPSU. At the same time as my home was searched, 28 Ukrainian intellectuals were arrested throughout the Ukraine, among them the journalist I. Svitlychnyy. The critic I. Dziuba was dismissed from his job in an editorial office, accused of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism", and deprived of the right to work in any type of job involving ideology.

Almost a month has passed and still there has been no mention in the press of the reasons for these arrests. Rumors from unknown sources circulate in Kiev that these persons supposedly wanted the secession of the UkrSSR from the USSR. Undoubtedly, these are unjustified charges, because neither in their activities, nor in their views anywhere or at any time, did these individuals reveal such desires. (In the writings of I. Svitlychnyy there is not even a hint of such views.) However, even if this were the case, what is the basis for charges of "Ukrainian nationalism"? In the world socialist system, the countries of the socialist bloc - Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the German Democratic Republic cooperate in a fraternal manner. Could it be that at the present stage in the development of the Communist movement, it would be expedient for the Ukrainian socialist nation to be a separate socialist unit in the socialist camp as well? In any case, the Constitution of the USSR guarantees all Soviet republics the right to secede from the USSR. If this is correct, then charging those who wish to take advantage of this right with "bourgeois nationalism" is completely groundless and can in no way serve as a pretext for arrest. Otherwise, holding that point of view, one can analogically charge with bourgeois nationalism the communists of Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and the GDR who considered it necessary to develop their socialist economy within the framework of independent socialist states. Such unjustified charges of bourgeois nationalism against Ukrainian intellectuals would be quite odd and would reveal that in this case we are dealing with a misunderstanding of the spirit of Lenin's nationalities policy.

The systematic charges of bourgeois nationalism against members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, which are repeated every 5 to 10 years, in the end become an odd and incomprehensible fact. Is it possible that the Ukrainian intelligentsia is so thoroughly bourgeois (50 years after the October revolution!) and hostile to the socialist order? Is there no other reason in the Soviet order which could cause a relapse into nationalism? But then what is nationalism? Can the desire to see the development of national culture, language, or even the development of a separate state, be termed nationalism, or is this every nation's legal right resulting from its economic, cultural and social development? All these problems require profound Communist reflection and clarification, because they play a primary role in the world communist movement.

Marxist dialectics teach us that all events have causes and that in order to liquidate negative social phenomena it is necessary to liquidate the causes for them. The tendency toward so-called "nationalism", undoubtedly, has its objective causes, and these objective causes are the continuation of an anti-Leninist nationalities policy in the Ukraine for the past 30 years. This policy consists of the Russification of the population and mass deportations of Ukrainians from the Ukraine to Siberia, Kazakhstan and other far-removed regions and the settlement of Ukrainian cities with non-Ukrainian, usually Russians. Naturally, such a policy is anti-Leninist and has nothing in common with Marxism; it is a policy which brings harm to the international Communist movement.

The unjustified repressions against members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia which began this month, as well as a whole list of violations of the nationalities policy which take place in the Soviet republics of the USSR, force me to turn to you - a noted leader of the Communist movement - with this appeal. I think that proletarian solidarity and communist conscience, as well as a deep concern for the purity of Communist ideas, for the purity of the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and a concern for the fate of the world communist movement, will force you to take a stand on my petition in complete adherence to Party principles. In short, the contents of my petition are:

1. In so far as the nationalities policy in socialist states is very important to the development of the international Communist movement, there should be an exchange of ideas on the nationalities question among the Communist Parties of the world.

2. In order to make the realization of such an exchange of ideas possible, I recommend calling an international conference of the Communist Parties of the world.

3. The round table conference of Communist Parties of the world should define the principles of the Marxist-Leninist nationalities policy, and these principles should be adhered to by the Communist Parties of the world in their practical building of Communism.

4. The round table conference of Communist Parties of the world should condemn anti-Semitism, Ukrainophobia, discrimination against nationalities and other manifestations of bourgeois ideology which occur in the practice of various Communist Parties. In particular, it should investigate the intolerable practice of discrimination against the Ukrainian population of Kuban; where Ukrainians have been deprived of the cultural and educational institutions in their native language which were liquidated in 1937 and not yet renewed.

5. The conference should separately examine the expediency of changing the composition of the population, the expediency of mass deportations of the members of a given nationality from the territory of a national republic.

6. The round table conference of the Communist parties of the world should examine the problem of how it is possible to carry out repressions, and with all conscientiousness condemn such repressions.

With deep respect and the warmest greetings,
(S.Y. Karavanskyy)

The Consul of the Polish National Republic in Kiev, to whom this petition was handed, promised to present it to his government. After reading the contents, the Czechoslovakian Consul refused to accept a similar petition addressed to A. Novotnyy. Both consuls refused to pass on this petition to other socialist states who are not represented in the UkrSSR.

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The Soviet Merchant Fleet and Fishing Activities

According to Jane's Fighting Ships 1966-67, the Soviet merchant fleet of freighters and tankers has grown to over 10 million tons and is the sixth largest in the world with 4.6% of the total world tonnage (as compared with 3% in 1960). V.G. Bakayev, Minister of the Merchant Fleet, stated that it is to expand to almost 14 million tons by 1970, and thus to about 6% of the world's shipping tonnage. (See the attached tables for details on the size and growth of the Soviet merchant fleet.)

This fleet is sufficient to carry about half of the USSR's water-borne export -- import trade. Since the USSR's exports are generally bulkier than its imports, Soviet ships are sometimes available for charter to foreign users for shipments to ports which are on or near the return route to the USSR. The Soviets, always squeezed for foreign currency, are trying to expand such operations in order to offset more of their heavy expenditures for chartering foreign vessels.

The Soviet presence abroad is considerably expanded by the merchant fleet operations of the USSR. In 1965, Soviet flag ships called 800 ports in 85 countries. Representatives of the Soviet Register of Shipping are sent to foreign countries where ships are being built for the USSR. Furthermore Soviet employes of "Sovfrakht," the agency which charters foreign vessels for Soviet use and Soviet vessels to foreign users, has representatives stationed in London, Oslo, Piraeus, Genoa, Hong Kong, and other shipping centers.

Soviet Fishing Activities

The Soviet fishing industry produced more than 6 million tons of fish in 1966, and expects to produce 8.5 to 9 million tons in 1970. The fish catch increased by 112% between 1955 and 1965; during this same period, according to estimates by Western fishery experts, the fishing fleet increased by approximately 200%. (The difference in these growth rates is discussed below.) Fish, mostly frozen and canned, provides about 15% of the protein in the Soviet national diet. Their exports of fish products are valued at \$40-50 million per annum. The Soviets hope to increase this amount substantially, which would mean increased competition with other exporters of fish products.

Soviet fishing operations have expanded to areas far from the USSR, and an increasing share of the total catch has tended to be from the more distant fishing grounds. Whereas the catch from the oceans and seas bordering the USSR comprised 71.5% of the total in 1960, it decreased to 61.8% in 1965.* Conversely, the catch from the Northwest, Central, and Southeast Atlantic increased from 9.4% in 1960 to 23.5% of the total in 1965. This trend towards long-distance fishing has continued in

*All statistics on the Soviet fish catch are from Soviet economic year-books and/or the Food and Agriculture Organization.

1966 and 1967 as the Soviets started operations in the waters off Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. (See the attached Soviet map which divides the world's oceans and seas into 20 fishing areas, and also the statistical table showing the breakdown of Soviet fishing by areas.)

Soviet foreign aid and trade agreements have also expanded Soviet maritime traffic with such countries as the United Arab Republic, Somalia, Yemen, Ghana, Guinea, and Cuba. In addition, the Soviets have discussed the construction of fishing facilities in Uruguay, Senegal, Tanzania, Sudan, and Ceylon. When in operation, such Soviet-built fishing ports usually accommodate or service Soviet fishing ships and crews. The Soviets not only provide ships but also train the fishing crews and set up the fish processing industry in the country to which they extend aid.

The USSR's maritime operations are further extended by survey and whaling ships. The survey fleet has about 18 ships which gather data on an ocean area for several years before the Soviet fishing vessels and processing ships come in to exploit the sea resources of the area.

Soviet Use of Merchant Marine and Fishing Fleet for Non-Commercial Purposes

Classically, the USSR's maritime and fishing fleets have been used as auxiliary naval forces and for a broad range of non-commercial purposes. Jane's Fighting Ships, the accepted authority on maritime affairs, in its report for 1966-67 said: "Wherever there is navigable water, the Soviet Navy has warships or paramilitary ships." In wartime these paramilitary ships would be completely at the disposal of the Soviet Navy. In peacetime these ships are used for electronic snooping, clandestine communications, smuggling agents and clandestine cargoes, etc.

According to Jane's Fighting Ships, 1966-67, these "intelligence trawlers" are a significant part of the fleet of non-naval ships surveilling the naval activities of all the maritime nations of the world. That such ships are numerous is indicated by the discrepancy in the growth rates of the Soviet fish catch (112% in 1955-67) and the fishing fleet (about 200% in the same period). The fishing fleet was modernized during this period so that the catch, according to Western fishery experts, should have risen at least as rapidly as the size of the fleet.

The Soviet's use of fisheries to gain political objectives is clearly demonstrated by Ghana's experience. The development of a fishing port and fishing fleet was included in the August 1960 agreement which provided the first USSR credit given Ghana. A year or so later the first Soviet military aid was granted to Ghana. Subsequently the Soviets (and other Eastern Europeans and Chinese Communists) developed a large base in Ghana for subversion throughout Africa. Similarly, the Soviets have used fisheries to tempt governments of other African countries during the early phases of discussions leading to more involved relationships. Parenthetically, the Ghanaian fishery project turned out disastrously, as it was poorly conceived, planned and executed; among other

problems the vessels supplied by the Soviets are unsuited for operations in the hot African climate, with the refrigeration equipment being particularly unsatisfactory.

In matters of fishing rights the Soviets have a mixed record. They blithely assume that they can fish in any international waters; but, when the countries near the fishing grounds complain about transgressions, the Soviets usually comply with the area's customary practices at least for a while. For example, the Soviets have abided by control regulations imposed by Argentina and have been induced to refrain from fishing in the spawning grounds of the North Atlantic during certain months of the year. As might be expected, the Soviets claim more international fishing rights than they are willing to accord to others. For example, the Soviets assert that the Japanese have no right to fish in the waters north of Hokkaido (Japan's northernmost island) although Japanese vessels in those waters could easily stay beyond the USSR's 12-mile territorial limit. The Soviets enforce this "rule" by patrol boats which frequently seize Japanese vessels and crews. According to the Christian Science Monitor of 26 October, the Soviets have detained 150 Japanese fishermen.

The Soviets' reputation for conservation in fishing has at times been tarnished when their practices have been inspected by foreigners. Fine mesh nets (with one-inch openings) have been found on Soviet fishing vessels; these nets, when used, sweep an area clean of large and small fish alike and, according to biologists, can leave the area barren. Furthermore, the Soviets, until requested to refrain, have fished spawning grounds during spawning season; although highly productive at that season, this practice sharply reduces the maximum sustainable yield of a fishing area. Another example is the Soviets' frequent practice of bottom trawling, which disrupts the marine environment and inhibits natural increases of stocks.

The long-term effects of Soviet large-scale fishing appear to be to reduce production. In the Northeast Atlantic, for example, the Soviets' catch declined from 11,340,000 centners (.1 metric ton) in 1960 to 10,410,00 centners in 1965. The harvest in the Northwest Atlantic, which the Soviets have fished heavily since the early 1960's, has declined in importance and yielded 17% less fish to the Soviets in 1966 than in 1965. Furthermore, as noted above, the share of the USSR's catch from its nearby waters declined from 71.5% of the total in 1960 to 61.8% in 1965. If it is true that the resources nearest to the USSR are being depleted, it becomes understandable why the Soviets are turning their attention more and more to the undeveloped fishing areas of the world.

Soviet Maritime Activities in South America in 1967

The Soviets received unusually heavy and unfavorable publicity for their merchant and fishing fleet operations in South America in 1967. They may well have anticipated the negative reactions as more people became aware of their large-scale fishing off the coasts of Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil. But the furor over the Soviet freighter Michurinsk was unexpected.

The Michurinsk docked at Buenos Aires on 12 July 1967. The Soviets attempted to offload some 14 or 15 crates which they claimed were "diplomatic baggage," but Argentine customs officials, noting that these crates were not listed on the ship's manifest demanded that the shipment be placed in bonded warehouse. The Soviets refused. The Argentines then decided that the Soviets had attempted to introduce the crates illegally and on 22 July, the Argentine police and customs officials attempted to board the ship to forcibly offload the crates. A brief scuffle ensued during which one Argentine and one Soviet seaman were slightly injured. Argentine reinforcements arrived and the Soviet crew broke out gas masks and tear gas grenades. The result was that the crates remained on the ship but its captain and 12 officers and crew members were arrested.

The affair aroused great indignation in Argentina and wide speculation on the nature of the secret cargo: arms, propaganda, high-powered electronic equipment. The Soviet Ambassador Yuri Volsky was avidly pursued by Argentinian journalists, one of whom wrote in La Prensa (Buenos Aires) on 28 July 1967 that: "As far as can be learned, Mr. Volsky maintained that their merchant ships possess diplomatic immunity by being the property of the USSR, and that, in addition, by reason of being auxiliaries to the Russian Navy are similar to warships." Other newspaper articles, which are attached, provide additional details on the Michurinsk incident.

The fishing by Soviet vessels off the coast of South America will probably be a subject of longer-term interest. Argentinians and Brazilians have become alarmed at the possibility that the Soviet fishing vessels will deprive their countries of resources which they intended to develop in the future. (See attached newspaper articles.) The Soviet catch of 733,000 centners in this area in 1966 and probably substantially more than that in 1967 is surely cause for alarm. This might produce continuing strong pressures for the Argentine and Brazilian governments to extend their exclusive fishing rights to a distance of 200 miles from their shores.

LA PRENSA, Buenos Aires
28 July 1967

SOVIET CAPTAIN MAKES STATEMENT

The Commander of the Mitchurinsk is being tried and cannot leave the country.

The federal judge in criminal and correctional matters, Dr. Jorge A. Aguirre, through the secretariat of Dr. Diego M. de Achaval, took down a declaration yesterday during a period of 8 hours from the captain of the Soviet ship, "Mitchurinsk", Vasili Stepanov, who is being tried for the crimes of resistance and assault against authority.

About midnight, the aforementioned officer left the court after having been notified during the examination of the facts that he was subject to the jurisdiction of the court and could not leave the Federal Capital. This order was also transmitted to the National Maritime Prefecture.

In the court we were informed that this order was in addition to any other restrictions that might be imposed following the investigation which was to be made. It was stated, in addition, that the investigation would proceed to clarify the events that had transpired including who the other participants from the ship were.

The Soviet Ambassador, Sr. Yuri Volsky, appeared yesterday at the Chancellery to obtain information on the progress of the proceedings.

It is known that the proceedings were begun by a charge from the National Maritime Prefecture stemming from resistance on the part of the crew of the Soviet ship last Saturday to attempts by Customs officers to inspect 12 crates and 3 trunks which the Soviets were trying to bring into the country classified as "diplomatic baggage."

Arrival of the captain.

At 1300 hours he arrived at the office of Dr. Aguirre, located on the fifth floor of the Palace of Justice. Captain Stepanov was accompanied by the Soviet Vice-consul, Sr. Antanas Iourchenas; the second in command of subprefecture of the New Port, Prefect Adalberto Rodriguez; the chief legal officer of the NMP, Prefect Antonio Palmero, and the auxiliary officer of the NMP, Antonio Carlos Cerdan. A few minutes later the interrogation began, attended by the Federal prosecutor, Dr. Silvano R. Becerra, the defense lawyers, Drs. Luis Beltran Montiel and Marchial Mendizabal, and a Russian interpreter.

Extended statement.

The hearing ended at 2100 hours, the reporters waiting in the access corridor leading to the court. Although no information was obtained up to this time, it was apparent that the questioning of the captain had been most thorough.

Also waiting for the proceedings to end were two individuals from the Shipping Agency Milanowski, representatives for all Soviet shipping in Argentina, and for ships of other nationalities. In addition, the Soviet Vice-consul waited, although he made sporadic trips out of the building; he gruffly refused any conversation with the reporters.

The shipping agents informed us that the Russian ship would be ready to sail, if nothing untoward occurred, in less than 10 days, with a cargo of four tons of leather, of which half was already on board.

They added that the vessel had brought in general cargo including coal and equipment for YPF (the Argentine national oil company). As for the prohibition on the captain leaving the country, the shipping agents stated the first mate could take command, or one of the captains that would be arriving about the Ljgov due in port from Montevideo today or tomorrow. The presence of two captains, they said, was due to the fact that one of them was making a transatlantic crossing for the first time and that the other was acting as an instructor.

End of the proceedings.

Finally, a photographer arrived and another employee of the NMP. The second took the fingerprints of the accused, and the first the necessary photographs for the dossier.

The accused then left accompanied by an officer of the NMP, the Vice-consul, and the shipping agents. It was clear to us that Captain Stepanov was not under arrest.

The Russian Ambassador at the Chancellery.

The Soviet Ambassador, Yuri Volsky, went to the Chancellery yesterday morning and met from 1200 to 1330 hours with the National Director for Protocol, Ambassador Federico del Solar Dorrego, and with the Director for Eastern Europe, Minister Alfredo J. Ure.

Afterwards it was learned that Mr. Volsky had come to find out what progress was being made in the judicial proceedings connected with the alleged crime of resistance to authority and to make a statement concerning the character of the Captain of the Mitchurinsk which in his view would make his appearance in court unnecessary. In reply, it has been learned, the Chancellery took the view that the Judiciary is an

independent power of the State, and that the captain of the ship has no resources to any type of diplomatic immunity.

As far as can be learned, Mr. Volsky maintained that their merchant ships possess diplomatic immunity by being the property of the USSR and, in addition, by reason of being auxiliaries to the Russian War Fleet, they are similar to warships.

Declarations of Sr. Volsky.

On being questioned as he left the Foreign Ministry, Sr. Volsky declared that he had come there to convey the Chancellery some statements concerning the incident on the Soviet ship. Questioned as to his possible trip to Moscow, he said that up to then this was not planned and that he was unable to state with certainty whether the interchange of notes between Argentina and the USSR had ended the diplomatic episode. He pointed out that before making any statement he would have to wait on instructions from his government which at the moment was considering the note delivered yesterday by the Chancellery in which they refused categorically to qualify the boxes consigned to the Soviet Embassy as "diplomatic baggage."

Prestó declaración el capitán soviético

El comandante del "Mitshurinsk" está procesado y no puede dejar el país

El juez federal en lo criminal y correccional, doctor Jorge A. Aguirre, por la secretaría del doctor Diego M. de Achával, recibió ayer declaración indagatoria, durante ocho horas, al capitán del buque soviético "Mitshurinsk", Vasily Stepanov, quien se encuentra procesado por los delitos de resistencia y atentado a la autoridad.

Cerca de la medianoche el mencionado oficial se retiró del tribunal, después de haber sido notificado de que durante la sustanciación de la causa queda sometido a la jurisdicción del juzgado y no puede ausentarse del radio de la capital federal. Además, esta disposición fue comunicada a la Prefectura Nacional Marítima.

En el juzgado se nos informó que tal prohibición se ha dispuesto sin perjuicio de ulteriores medidas de la restricción de la libertad del procesado que pudieren resultar de la investigación que se realiza. Añadió que se prosiguen las diligencias procesales tendientes a lograr el esclarecimiento de los hechos ocurridos, y a determinar la participación que en los mismos pudo haber cabido a otros integrantes de la mencionada nave, a quienes se procura individualizar.

El embajador de la Unión Soviética, señor Yuri Volsky, concurrió ayer por la mañana a la Cancillería con el objeto de interesarse en la tramitación del sumario judicial.

Según se sabe, el sumario fue iniciado por denuncia de la Prefectura Nacional Marítima en razón de la resistencia opuesta el sábado último por la tripulación del buque ruso, ante el procedimiento dispuesto por las autoridades de la Dirección Nacional de Aduanas, tendiente a la inspección de doce bultos y tres baúles que se pretendían hacer ingresar al país bajo el amparo del sistema de introducción denominado de "valija diplomática".

Llegada del capitán

A las 13, llegó al despacho del doctor Aguirre, ubicado en

el quinto piso del Palacio de Justicia, el capitán Stepanov, acompañado por el vicecónsul soviético, señor Antanas Iourchenas; el segundo jefe de la subprefectura de Puerto Nuevo, prefecto Adalberto Rodríguez; el jefe de sumarios de esa repartición, prefecto Antonio Palmero, y el oficial auxiliar de la Prefectura Nacional Marítima, Antonio Carlos Cerdán. Minutos después comenzó la declaración indagatoria, a la que asistieron el procurador fiscal federal, doctor Silvano R. Becerra; los defensores del procesado, doctores Luis Beltrán Montiel y Marcial Mendiábal, y un traductor del idioma ruso.

Extensa declaración

La declaración finalizó recién a las 21, y los periodistas aguardaron en el pasillo de acceso al juzgado. Si bien hasta esa hora no se suministró ninguna información, trascendió en cambio que la exposición del capitán ruso era de una extrema minuciosidad.

También aguardaron en el lugar la finalización de la diligencia, dos integrantes de la agencia marítima Milanowski, encargada, según nos dijeron aquéllos, de la representación de todos los buques rusos en la Argentina, y también de otros de distintas nacionalidades. Además estuvo presente durante todo el tiempo, con esporádicos alejamientos del lugar, el vicecónsul soviético, quien rehuyó cualquier contacto con la gente de prensa, cortando hoscamente los intentos de diálogo.

Los representantes de la agencia marítima nos informaron que la nave rusa estaría pronta para zarpar, de no mediar inconvenientes, en menos de diez días, con una carga de cuatro toneladas de cuero, de la cual se encuentra ya a bordo la mitad.

Agregaron que trajo a nuestro país carga general, entre ella carbón y equipos para Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales. En cuanto al impedimento del capitán para dejar el país, nos aclararon que, según suponían,

llegado el caso, podría tomar el mando de la embarcación el primer oficial, o bien uno de los capitanes que traerá a bordo la embarcación de la misma bandera, de nombre "Ljgov", que debe arribar a puerto hoy o mañana, procedente de Montevideo. La presencia de los dos capitanes, nos señalaron, se debe a que uno de ellos es la primera vez que hace un viaje trasoceánico, por lo que el otro cumple la función de instructor.

Fin de la diligencia

Finalizada la declaración, llegaron al despacho un fotógrafo y un empleado de la Prefectura Nacional Marítima. El segundo tomó las impresiones digitales del acusado, y el primero las fotografías necesarias para el prontuario.

Posteriormente el acusado se retiró acompañado por un oficial de la Prefectura Nacional Marítima, el vicecónsul y los agentes marítimos. Se nos aclaró que el capitán Stepanov no estuvo en ningún momento detenido.

El embajador ruso en la Cancillería

El embajador soviético, Yuri Volsky, concurrió ayer por la mañana a la Cancillería y mantuvo una reunión, desde las 12 hasta las 13.30, con el director nacional de ceremonial, embajador Federico del Solar Dorrego, y con el jefe del área Europa Oriental, ministro Alfredo J. Ure.

Posteriormente se informó que el señor Volsky concurrió para interesarse sobre la marcha del proceso judicial que se sustancia en el juzgado federal por el presunto delito de resistencia a la autoridad y para formular consideraciones sobre el carácter del capitán del buque "Mitshurinsk", que a su juicio podía dispensarlo de su comparecencia ante el tribunal. Frente a éste, se indicó, la Cancillería emitió su punto de vista en el sentido de que la justicia es un poder independiente del Estado y que el capitán del buque mencionado no está amparado por ningún tipo de inmunidad diplomática.

Según pudo saberse, el señor Volsky sostuvo que los buques mercantes poseen inmunidad diplomática por ser propiedad de la URSS y que, además, están asimilados a los barcos de la marina de guerra rusa por formar parte de su flota auxiliar.

Declaraciones del señor Volsky

Al ser interrogado por los periodistas, mientras se retiraba del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, el embajador soviético manifestó que había concurrido para hacer conocer a la Cancillería algunas apreciaciones sobre el incidente suscitado en el buque ruso "Mitshurinsk". Al ser preguntado sobre su posible viaje a Moscú, el señor Volsky afirmó que "hasta ahora no había nada previsto" y que no podía precisar si con el intercambio de notas efectuado entre la Argentina y la Unión Soviética se daba por finalizado el episodio diplomático. Señaló que para hacer cualquier apreciación debía aguardar instrucciones de su gobierno, quien actualmente considera la nota entregada anteayer por la Cancillería en la que se rechaza terminantemente el calificativo de "valija diplomática" de los bultos consignados a la embajada rusa en nuestro país.

Jane's Fighting Ships 1966-67, edited by Raymond U. B. Blackman,

Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd., London 1966

U.S.S.R.

The size of a nation's mercantile marine is the measure of her maritime interest and of necessity the might of her fighting navy. This has always been so, but particularly applicable now to the Soviet Union, whose merchant fleet of over 2,000 ships, aggregating 9,500,000 tons gross, is twice as big numerically and four times the size in capacity as it was only a decade ago, and is now the sixth largest in the world. The U.S.S.R. is now not only a naval power (second only to the United States), an air power, a military power, a nuclear power and a space power, but a commercial power by virtue of her merchant ships and ocean trade routes.

This great new merchant fleet has all the necessary naval backing in the shape of ubiquitous fleets built up over the last 20 years to a peak of professionalism and efficiency. But even this is not the sum of the Soviet Union's maritime strength, for there are also a fleet of survey ships, a fleet of research ships, a fleet of fishing vessels, and the better known fleet of intelligence trawlers which keep watch and ward over the naval activities of all the other maritime nations of the world, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom.

The Soviet Navy is now blatantly flaunting its numerical and intrinsic strength for all to see, and playing it as on the chequered board. Soviet warships have come to be expected as an occupational hazard during all national and international naval exercises. The Soviet naval war game is now a global fact of life. Where the British Navy held sway for a hundred years the U.S.S.R. now has a powerful permanent fleet in the Mediterranean for the first time in her history. But this is only one fleet: there are others in the Pacific, the Atlantic, in African waters, to the east and the west, and in northern waters.

Wherever there is a demonstrably strategic sphere, wherever there is an obvious tactical area and another

nation's *raison d'être* for being there, there also is the Soviet Navy. Wherever there is navigable water the Soviet Navy has warships or para-military ships, and any operation carried out by other navies is their shadow. A large proportion of the ocean-ranging Soviet Fleet consists of submarines—nuclear, missile and conventional.

The Soviet Union has not suddenly come to realise the value of sea-power, because it has been progressively building up the fleet for 20 years, but the time has now come when it can exploit the oceans to the full, matching submarines, cruisers, destroyers, escorts, support ships, minesweepers, guided missile patrol boats, oilers, store carriers, and electronic surveillance scouts with anything that the other major naval powers can produce. Its naval forces are now deployed on a world-wide scale, and are capable of exerting a strong maritime influence on world affairs.

For several years past the Soviet Navy has been turning out almost at a set annual pace a new type in each of the submarine, destroyer, escort and minesweeper categories, and this year has been no exception, but it is becoming increasingly difficult to keep track of new warships or to accurately assess the numbers of units in each class, since the Soviet Navy seems to make a practice of changing the hull markings so that one ship can bear different numbers on different occasions.

The Soviet Navy is now estimated to include 40 nuclear powered submarines, 340 conventionally powered submarines, 20 cruisers, 110 destroyers, 100 escorts, 300 coastal escorts, 300 minesweepers, 100 missile patrol boats, 350 motor torpedo boats, and 200 landing craft. It is difficult to give an accurate figure for auxiliaries and service craft as they run into thousands, and many mercantile vessels are used for ancillary purposes and constitute para-military support.

Merchant Fleet of the USSR

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Ships</u>	<u>Deadweight tons</u>	<u>World total Deadweight tons</u>
1946	507	2,699,000	97,884,000
1950	515	2,583,000	107,215,000
1956	716	3,439,000	136,880,000
1960	873	4,939,000	171,890,000
1965	1,345	9,561,000	217,229,000
1970		13,900,000 (Soviet estimate)	260,600,000

Source: The Soviet Merchant Marine, U.S. Department of Commerce/Maritime Administration, 1967

Fish Catch of the USSR

(In metric tons; includes whales and sea animals)


<u>Year</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
1938	1,542,000
1948	1,575,000
1955	2,737,000
1960	3,541,000
1965	5,774,000
1966	6,093,000
1970 (plan)	8,500,000 to 9,000,000

Soviet Fish Catch in Selected Areas

(In thousands of centners; 1 centner = .1 metric ton)

		1960	% of total	1965	% of total	1966
		Catch		Catch		Catch
I	North East Atlantic	11,340	32.3%	10,410	18.2%	11,477
II	North West Atlantic	2,850	8.1%	8,531	14.9%	7,112
IV	West Central Atlantic			567	1.0%	374
III	East Central Atlantic			695	1.2%	793
V	South East Atlantic	470	1.3%	3,671	6.4%	3,612
VI	South West Atlantic					733
VII	North West Indian Ocean					
VIII	South West Indian Ocean	-	-	347	0.6%	757
IX	South East Indian Ocean					
XI	North Pacific Ocean	8,555	24.4%	18,260	31.9%	16,352
XIX	Caspian Sea	3,669	10.5%	4,480	7.7%	3,758
XX	Azov and Black Seas	1,526	4.3%	2,265	3.9%	3,077

Sources: Economic Handbooks of the USSR Food and Agriculture Organization



THE COMMUNIST CONCLAVE AT BUDAPEST

The "Consultative Conference" of Communist parties to be held in Budapest in February 1968 offers remarkable opportunities for disruptive attacks against the Communist movement. The major divisive issues are discussed in the enclosed background paper and news articles.

Media and organizational assets -- political, labor, youth, etc. -- can seize on the Budapest meeting to attack the Communists on a wide variety of issues. These issues will vary radically according to the local Communist position, the nature of the asset employed, and the inventiveness of case officers and agents. The following suggested lines of attack may stimulate further ideas for treatment.

1. Discrediting the Communist movement as a whole. The Budapest meeting proves once again the basic allegiance of Communist groups to an international movement and ultimately to the Soviet Union. Thus talk of independence, autonomy, and true commitment to popular fronts and other forms of united action is false and dishonest. The meeting threatens to create a new Comintern. Gross Soviet efforts to force Rumania and other Communists striving for autonomy into line prove once again the monolithic nature and Soviet domination of the movement. Efforts of the Italians and others to claim their autonomy are eyewash designed to deceive potential collaborators. The division of the movement into three camps, the Soviet, Chinese and Cuban centers, shows that Communism is ultimately only a means of attaining and keeping power and uses ideology solely to assist in reaching this objective. It further shows the disintegration of the movement, a point emphasized by the object of the Budapest conference: to try to rebuild Communist unity in the face of the "imperialist offensive."

2. Exploiting the issue of Communist China. The absence of the Chinese Communists and their allies from Budapest proves they have excommunicated themselves from the movement, or that the Budapest meeting is not representative of the Communist movement -- depending on how one views it. A move against the Chinese Communists at the meeting is a move against independence and autonomy of Communist parties; it makes permanent a breach which might otherwise heal; it places North Vietnam in an impossible position, since that country requires the support of the entire Communist world; it rejects the right of such parties as the North Korean to maintain contact with Moscow and China. On the other hand China's vituperative attacks against the USSR, despite the Soviet restraint, its refusal to participate in the normal activities of the international movement, its sectarianism, its hindrance of joint Communist aid to the war effort in Vietnam, its splitting activities in local parties around the world, its absurd praise of Mao's thoughts -- all these things show that it is the Chinese who have effectively withdrawn from the international Communist movement. These points can be played against local pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese factions to heighten their mutual antipathies.

3. Representativeness of the Budapest meeting. Not only will the participants at Budapest represent only a part of the Communist movement, but that movement itself is not truly representative of the entire revolutionary movement in the world. Many militant revolutionary groups in Africa and Latin America do not consider themselves Communist. Thus the Communists are presumptuous in speaking for all revolutionaries.

4. Black operations. Mutual antagonisms, jealousies, and special interests make the occasion of the Budapest meeting an ideal occasion for disruptive black operations. Local Communist and leftist factions will attack each other on various grounds such as subservience to Moscow, allegiance to Peking, lack of representativeness, and so on. These attacks can be started or stimulated by carefully planned black operations.

The Communist Conclave at Budapest

Since the beginning, a major problem of the Soviet Union has been to preserve and extend its authority over the international Communist movement. Lenin and Stalin accomplished this through formal international organizations, notably the Comintern. However, under Khrushchev a new system developed: international gatherings of Communist parties. He convened international conferences in Moscow in 1957 and 1960 and was in the process of organizing a third when he was ousted in 1964. All of these meetings were called in response to signs of the crumbling of Communist unity and the erosion of Soviet domination. That they proved generally ineffective in bolstering the Soviet position or the unity of the communist movement has not deterred the present Soviet leadership from calling a new "Consultative Conference" to be held in Budapest in February 1968.

The conference of ruling Communist parties was called in 1957 following the political upheavals in Poland and Hungary of 1956. It was held in Moscow in conjunction with the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet revolution and resulted in a call for unity in the bloc, with Moscow "at its head." The 1960 Conference was attended by representatives of 81 Communist and Workers' parties and resulted in the issuance of a lengthy General Statement that was intended to serve as a doctrinal guide for the entire Communist movement. However this statement, which recognized the Soviet party as the "vanguard" of the movement, but not its "head," was only a compromise between the Soviet and Chinese ideological positions and did little more than paper over the profound cracks then developing in world Communist unity.

Soviet-Chinese relations deteriorated rapidly after the 1960 Conference and Soviet efforts to force the Chinese Communists back into line by the abrupt withdrawal of Soviet aid served only to increase dissent in the movement. It soon became apparent to the Soviets that a new meeting was needed to re-define the international Communist line and to tackle the problem of Communist China. Under Khrushchev's leadership the Soviet Union invited the 26 parties which had organized the 1960 Conference and had drafted its General Statement to a Consultative Meeting in Moscow in 1964 to prepare for a new world Communist Conference. The ouster of Khrushchev in October 1964 forced a postponement of this meeting, which was eventually held in March 1965 with only 19 of the 26 invitees present; missing were China, Albania, North Vietnam, North Korea, Rumania, Japan and Indonesia.

At the March 1965 meeting it soon became apparent that the divisions in the Communist movement were so serious that a world conference would cause more problems than it would solve. It was therefore agreed that while a world meeting should eventually be convened, it should be preceded by further consultations among the Communist parties.

Since then Sino-Soviet relations have, if anything, worsened and other problems have arisen to challenge Soviet leadership of the movement, notably the growing independence of both Cuba and Rumania. Thus a declaration by Bulgarian party General Secretary Todor Zhivkov in November 1966 that "conditions are ripening" for the convening of a new world Communist conference was not entirely unexpected. During the following year other Soviet-dominated parties took up the call and by the time of the celebrations of the 50th Anniversary of the Soviet Revolution in November 1967 the Soviets were able to claim that "some 70 parties" supported the convening of a conference.

Apparently final agreement was reached during the Anniversary celebrations and on 24 November 1967 it was announced that a Consultative Meeting would be held in February 1968 in Budapest, hosted by the Hungarian Party. The organizers will be 18 of the 19 parties which met in Moscow in March 1965; the absentee will be Cuba. The 18 are: Australia, Argentina, Bulgaria, Brazil, Britain, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Finland, France, Hungary, India, Italy, Mongolia, Poland, Syria, USA, USSR, and West Germany. According to the original announcement, invitations have been sent to all other Communist parties (the latest Soviet count lists 88).

The purpose of the Budapest conference, according to the official communique, is to permit "a collective exchange of opinion concerning the convocation of an international meeting of Communist and workers parties." That international meeting, in turn, will have as its objective the "strengthening of the unity of the Communist movement and also the rallying of all socialist, democratic forces in the struggle against imperialism, for national and social liberation of the peoples, and for world peace." This statement is deliberately vague on whether or not a subsequent international meeting will actually be held. Later comment by Soviet, Polish, and French Communist makes it clear, however, that those groups, at least, expect to convert the "consultative" meeting into a "preparatory" one. The Polish paper Trybuna Ludu, for example, stated on 26 November that the "consultative" meeting will draw up preliminary draft documents and an agenda for a future world conference. The French party noted in L'Humanite on 29 November that the Budapest meeting will require documents to be worked out collectively by all interested parties. However, the vagueness of the statement regarding a future meeting was necessary to avoid presenting certain recalcitrant parties with a fait accompli; these parties have no desire to commit themselves to a later international conference without more precise agreement on its composition, purpose, and likely stand on certain crucial issues. Indeed, the convocation of the Budapest meeting is only the first of the problems which must be resolved before an international conference is held.

One major question is: who is to be invited to such a meeting? The Yugoslav and Italian parties, especially, have pointed out that a

closed meeting of Communist parties would isolate the Communists from other leftists, increasing the difficulties of forming popular fronts and other forms of "joint action," and would greatly increase the apprehensiveness of others who would see in this a resurrection of the Comintern. Moreover, a closed Communist meeting would exclude other groups which in many cases are more representative of the leftist and revolutionary forces in their countries than miniscule or non-existent Communist parties. The Soviets are believed to support the concept of strictly Communist meeting since, if the main aim of the conference is to promote the identity and unity of the world Communist movement, there is little point in diluting it with non-party members. The question becomes even more complicated when one considers that in some countries there are several Communist parties, in others there are both Communist and revolutionary parties, often bitterly opposed to each other, and in yet others the important revolutionary organizations may even be anti-Communist.

Another major problem faces the conference organizers: that of Communist China. The Soviets have had to recognize that there is too much opposition to any move to cast the Chinese out of the Communist movement to make such an effort worthwhile. In an effort to attract as large an attendance as possible to the Budapest meeting the Soviets declared in a statement in Pravda on 28 November that "the purpose of the conference cannot be interference in the affairs of any fraternal Party whatever or, still less, excommunication of anybody from the Communist movement." This disavowal was repeated in a Pravda article on 5 December by Vitaly Korionov who wrote: "The ostracizing of anybody from the Communist movement cannot be the purpose of the conference. The opponents of Communism should have learned long ago that ostracism runs counter to the very nature of the Communist movement." (Korionov seemed to have conveniently forgotten about Yugoslavia's ostracism by the Soviets in 1948.) Actually it is hardly necessary to cast out the Chinese since they have effectively excommunicated themselves. Moreover, past opposition has diminished; the Italian Party, which for years had opposed the convening of a world conference because it believed such an act would aggravate the division between Moscow and Peking, now says its doubts have been invalidated by Chinese behavior and that a conference now is timely.

While the Italians may believe that a world conference might not make matters worse, they evidently expect the conference not to take action against the Chinese Communists. Whether this will turn out to be the case remains to be seen; the anti-Chinese statements in many of the recent calls by Communist leaders for a world conference may indicate that China will figure on the agenda no matter what. A further consideration is that the war in Vietnam will surely loom large as a conference topic. But it is difficult to envisage a discussion of this subject avoiding for long the question of Chinese hindrance of joint Communist aid to North Vietnam.

The final major problem to be resolved before convening a world conference of Communist and workers' parties involves the fundamental issue of Moscow's hegemony over the Communist movement versus party autonomy. Few Soviet Communists have lost their deep emotional conviction that Moscow is and must be the leader of the world Communist movement, even though some of them have perhaps recognized the rationality of claims to equality by other Communist parties. Knowing this, leaders of other Communist parties are attempting to circumscribe the nature of a possible world conference. Waldeck Rochet of the French Communist Party, for example, asserts that "it would be wrong to adopt a general and universal document like the 1960 Declaration." The Italian Party, progenitor of "polycentrism," insists that the prerequisite to a world conference is the acceptance of a new attitude throughout the world movement, the acceptance of differences without accusations of treason: "Strict autonomy for each party is what is needed without professing to impose obligatory lines and courses, and without implying hostile attitudes to parties which do not agree to some common decisions," Luigi Longo wrote in the party weekly, Rinascita, on 20 October 1967.

Rumania has been one of the chief proponents of national autonomy within the Communist movement. Its position was clearly stated by Nicolae Ceausescu in an article published in Pravda on 17 October in which he stated the Rumanian insistence on sovereignty, national independence and a Communist party's obligations to its own working class and its own people. He called for "relations of a new type" among Communist countries to create "favorable conditions for the affirmation of their national essence and individuality, for closeness and cooperation between governments, between free and sovereign nations."

This degree of autonomy is not without strong opposition in the Communist movement. Rumania's position was denounced by Hungarian party leader Janos Kadar in Pravda on 17 September: "It is impossible to approve the position sometimes taken which expresses itself in a neutral attitude to disputed questions or even in direct refusal of international contacts and comradely exchanges of opinion. It is also impossible to consider internationalist" any party which -- "even for the best of intentions -- declares its own particular interpretation of the international situation." And Czechoslovak Party Secretary Vladimir Koucky wrote in the August issue of the World Marxist Review that "there can be no internationalism that is neutral and not binding on parties," no departure from the "application of generally obligatory norms for the individual detachments of the Communist movement."

If such strictures were not sufficient to alarm those Communists seeking greater independence from Moscow's grip, Ceausescu's speech to the Rumanian National Party Conference on 6 December should give pause for reflection. Ceausescu rebuked the Soviet Union for putting economic pressure on Rumania and unilaterally violating economic agreements

between the two countries. "Differences of opinion" over international and party affairs should not be an excuse for "influencing economic relations," he said, declaring Rumania "will not tolerate such violations." It was clear that one of the "differences of opinion" was over the Budapest conference and its possible sequel in the form of an international conclave. If the Soviets were prepared to apply this degree of pressure to a ruling Communist party, what might be the pressures on lesser Communist groups?

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Moscow prepares to stop the rot

After months of hesitation and endless confabulations with other party leaders, the Russians have at last made up their minds to take an important step towards holding a world communist conference. According to an official statement put out in Moscow on November 23rd, the Soviet and 17 other communist parties have decided to convene a meeting in Budapest for a "collective exchange of opinions" about a world communist conference. It should be quite an impressive turn-out. The number of communist parties which have openly committed themselves to an international conference has risen from around 40 to more than 65; presumably at any rate all these will accept the invitation to go to Budapest.

On the other hand, in spite of their impressive majority support, the Russians have to face the fact that the communist movement is now virtually split into three and that the conference they want to hold is more likely to draw attention to these divisions than to paper them over. The quarrel with Peking must have become an accepted fact of life in Moscow. With Chinese spokesmen proclaiming Peking as the new centre of the international communist movement and urging the Russian people to get rid of their present rulers, it is clear that for the time being—which does not necessarily mean for always—the breach between Moscow and Peking will remain unhealed.

But there is also the rapidly widening gap between Moscow and Havana. Dr. Castro has no use at all for Russia's cautious attitude towards revolutionary violence. It can be small consolation to the Russians to know that Havana's relations with Peking are also distinctly cool. Indeed, Dr. Castro's theories about revolutionary tactics—in so far as they have been distinctly formulated—are enough to horrify any well-brought-up communist, whether he is pro-Moscow or pro-Peking, for they spring from the belief that the party should play second fiddle to the guerrilla forces when it is a question of organising a revolution. They could, however, catch on in parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America. There

are already signs of divisions over Cuban ideas inside some pro-Moscow Latin American parties. Havana, however odd its interpretation of marxism-leninism, seems set on becoming a third centre of world communism. On present form, it will be very surprising if the Cubans consent to have anything to do with any Moscow-oriented meeting.

The Russians have other worries apart from the Cubans. There is no sign that the important and influential parties of Yugoslavia, Rumania, North Vietnam and North Korea have overcome their distaste for a conference. And to secure the amount of support they can now claim, the Russians have had to make considerable concessions about the kind of meeting they would be willing to settle for. There is no question now of formally excommunicating the Chinese, partly because they have in effect excommunicated themselves, but partly also because there was too much opposition to this project among the pro-Moscow parties. There is no question either of getting the participants to sign any grand new statement of ideological principles. The Russians have had to abandon this because of the lively fears of individual parties that it would amount to an attempt to sabotage their autonomy.

There will also be difficulties about exactly who is to be invited to the meeting. The Italian communists, whose views carry weight, feel as strongly as do the Yugoslavs that the communist movement should not divorce itself from other progressive but non-communist movements and that representatives of these groups should be invited to attend any world communist meeting. The Russians are believed to oppose this—not surprisingly, since if their main aim in pushing for a conference is to reassert the identity of the communist movement, they will not want it to be diluted by delegates who may be very worthy men but lack party cards. All the same, the Russians may in the end have to give way on this.

Why then, one wonders, are the Russians so doggedly determined to have a meeting at all? One reason is that

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Rumanian, Soviet Ties Near Crisis

By Anatole Shub

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Dec. 16—The Soviet Union today stood at the brink of a major crisis with independent Communist Rumania which might prove as fateful as Moscow's break with Yugoslavia 20 years ago.

The next moves on both sides remained unclear after Kremlin summit talks Thursday and Friday, led by Russia's Leonid Brezhnev and Rumania's Nicolae Ceaucescu, failed to clear the air of Rumanian charges that the Soviet Union was applying economic pressures because of the political differences between the two countries.

Unofficial Soviet sources reported tonight that Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders would go to Bucharest next month in a last-ditch attempt to heal the breach. However, Rumanian sources said they had heard nothing of a visit so soon. It would be more logical, they said, for the Russians to come after the Budapest international Communist "consultative meeting" scheduled for late February.

The Budapest meeting remains one of the main subjects of disagreement between the Soviet Union, strongly promoting a world Communist conference, and Rumania, which suspects the Soviet purpose to be the production of a joint policy declaration unacceptable to China, with which Rumania remains on good terms.

Other major areas of discord include the German problem, the Middle East, arms control and the Soviet-Rumanian friendship treaty due to expire next month.

However, all these policy differences are said to pale by comparison with the controversy over alleged Soviet failure to deliver raw materials and industrial goods promised to Rumania under long-term trade agreements.

Neither Russian, Rumanian nor Western sources have been able to confirm or deny whether Soviet deliveries have been tardy or insufficient, or to specify which if any goods were being held back.

Nevertheless, observers here stressed the inclusion in Friday night's otherwise bland Soviet-Rumanian communique of the phrase that the two

sides had "exchanged opinions" on the fulfillment of earlier trade agreements. Observers said that had the Soviets denied any conscious pressures, agreed to investigate non-deliveries, or provided reasonable technical explanations, the communique would not have registered an

exchange of views on past trade pacts, but pledges to improve future trade.

Although Rumania has been shifting its trade westward during the past five years, the Soviet Union remains its leading trade partner. Russia has not only supplied massive quantities of coal and iron ore but has also pledged heavy machinery for such key projects as the Galati steel combine and the Iron Gates hydroelectric station and dam on the Danube.

A massive Soviet economic squeeze, as applied by Josef Stalin to Yugoslavia in 1948 or by Nikita Khrushchev to China in 1960, could hurt Rumania seriously despite its steadily increasing commerce with West Germany, France, Italy and other Western states.

However, the present Soviet leaders are generally considered unlikely to behave in so impetuous a manner. Several of them, notably President Nikolai Podgorny, are known to favor a live-and-let-live policy with the Rumanian as well as the Yugoslav "National Communists."

Podgorny was reported to have paid a secret visit to Rumania last summer which

resulted in Rumanian participation in joint Warsaw Pact maneuvers and other measures to reduce tensions between Moscow and Bucharest. He took part in the Thursday and Friday Kremlin talks with Ceaucescu, although he was conspicuously absent from even the social events during the visit by East Germany's Walter Ulbricht earlier in the week.

Some observers believed that the Soviet stand would not be fully clarified until the next plenum of the Party Central Committee. According to some rumors, a plenum may be held in the coming week, but some reports, apparently more substantial, say it will take place in January, with Communist unity, the Budapest meeting and the Rumanian problem high on the agenda.

The difficulties of prediction are increased by the recollection that when Stalin expelled Yugoslavia from the Communist bloc on June 28, 1948, it became known only then that the crisis between Belgrade and Moscow had been under way for nearly a year.

experimentation going on (in eastern Europe) and anyway the Russians can hardly claim to be giving a lead here. They may, however, argue that a conference confined to specific issues that can all be presented as part of an "anti-imperialist" crusade might well secure virtually unanimous agreement. After all, every good communist is against "US imperialism." Other issues, like Germany and the Middle East, might be more difficult to manage because communists in power are increasingly sensitive to the national interests and prejudices of the countries they govern.

In fact, enlightened self-interest rather than loyalty to Moscow will be the predominant feeling at any world communist meeting. Everyone will be on their guard against any attempt by the Russians to circumscribe their freedom of action. It used to be the Chinese whose position was under scrutiny at international communist gatherings. In future, however much criticism may be hurled at the be the Russians who are on trial.

they apparently feel obliged to demonstrate, somehow or other, that the communist movement is still a force that counts on the international scene, and this feeling may be reinforced, perhaps misguidedly, by the defiance of Peking and Havana. A second reason is probably the problem of their own standing in the communist movement. Brought up as the direct heirs of the Bolshevik revolution, Russia's leaders cannot, it seems, quite shake off the feeling that all—or at any rate, most—communist parties ought to look up to Moscow in some kind of special way. They cannot resist hankering after some kind of communist consensus that would be initiated in Moscow and more or less meekly accepted by the rest.

But what kind of a consensus? Not about the correct path of internal development for a communist state because there is too much pragmatic